15.1 | Civilian
personnel
263.
Mr Boateng
agreed the FCO bid in full on 30 January.182
264.
By 21 April,
the number of UK civilians seconded to the CPA had risen to
about
260, with
approximately 120 each in Baghdad and Basra, and 20 elsewhere in
Iraq.183
Between 70
and 80 MOD civil servants were directly supporting Op
TELIC.
265.
During the CPA
period, the expansion of the British Office Baghdad and
the
opening of
a British Office in Basra were delayed by the limited availability
of security
assets and
the need to prioritise other UK activities in Iraq.
266.
The British
Office Baghdad was opened by Mr Segar on 5 May
2003.184
267.
Originally
staffed by a team of four, by late summer 2003 it had eight
UK‑based
staff and a
locally employed British Council officer. The Commercial Section
was staffed
by two UKTI
officials and a secondee from industry.
268.
The flat pack
Embassy arrived in Baghdad on 23 June in 80
containers.
It consisted
of prefabricated office and accommodation units and was
designed
to house up
to 40 staff.
269.
On 18 July, in
a letter to Mr Boateng requesting additional funds for
security
enhancements
to FCO posts in Iraq, described earlier in this Section,
Mr Straw reported
that the
British Office Baghdad was assembling the flat pack Embassy under
24‑hour
sniper
watch and would “soon be up to full strength of eight UK‑based
officers”.185
270.
On 5 August,
FCO officials discussed proposals from Mr Segar to expand
the
British
Office Baghdad to 10 UK‑based and 23 local staff.186
Mr Crompton
informed
Mr Segar
that availability of security assets was likely to be “a major
constraint” on his
expansion
plans: “further increases in armed protection teams, armoured cars
and other
security
equipment could only be funded through compensating savings
elsewhere”.
He advised
Mr Segar “to think carefully about prioritising”.
271.
On 19 August,
after the bombing of the Canal Hotel, the British Office
Baghdad
was moved
from the former British Embassy compound to a villa in the
CPA
272.
After visiting
Baghdad at the beginning of September, Mr Crompton
advised
Mr Edward
Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East and North Africa, that there was
“a clear
182
Letter
Boateng to Straw, 30 January 2004, ‘Iraq Reserve
Claim’.
183
Letter
Tebbit to Turnbull, 21 April 2004, [untitled].
184
Minute IPU
[junior official] to PS [FCO], ‘Iraq: Briefing for Visit – 25‑26
November 2003’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
‘Background on Other Issues’.
185
Letter
Straw to Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 18 July 2003,
‘Iraq‑Related Costs’.
186
Letter
Crompton to Segar, 13 August 2003, ‘BOB staffing, security and
accommodation’.
187
Minute IPU
[junior official] to PS [FCO], 24 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing
for Visit – 25‑26 November
2003’
attaching Paper [unattributed], ‘Background on Other
Issues’.
291