The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
634.
In response to
a question from Mr Kennedy about whether Mr Annan had
said that
action
without a second resolution would breach the UN Charter,
Mr Blair stated that
Mr Annan
had said that it was “important that the UN comes together”.
Mr Blair added
that it
was:
“…
complicated to get that agreement … when one nation is saying that
whatever
the
circumstances it will veto a resolution.”
635.
Mr Kennedy
wrote to Mr Blair later that day repeating his request that
Mr Blair
should
publish Lord Goldsmith’s advice.252
A copy of
the letter was sent to Lord
Goldsmith.
636.
A UK
proposal for a side statement setting out possible tests for
Iraq
attracted
little support amongst Security Council members.
637.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock suggested early on the afternoon of 12 March that in
the
Security
Council that day the UK should:
•
table a
revised draft resolution explaining that the UK was “setting aside
the
ultimatum
concept” in operative paragraph 3 of the draft of 7 March
“because
it had
not attracted Council support”;
•
distribute
a side statement with tests for Saddam Hussein, “explaining that
the
text was a
national position to which the UK wanted as many Council
Members
as possible
to adhere to maintain the pressure on Saddam”; and
•
state that
the deadline of the 17 March by which it had been proposed that
Iraq
should
demonstrate full, immediate and active co-operation in accordance
with
resolution
1441 was “being reviewed”.253
638.
Sir Jeremy
favoured using the open debate in the Security Council later that
day
to explain
the UK move, adding: “At no point will I signal, in public or in
private, that there
is any UK
fallback from putting this new text to a vote within 24-36
hours.”
639.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had explained the gist of the plan to
Ambassador
Negroponte
who was briefing Secretary Powell for a conversation with President
Bush.
640.
Sir Jeremy had
spoken to Mr Annan and had explained the UK concept of a
side
statement
and tests which Saddam Hussein could meet “within the tight
deadline we
would offer
(ideally 10 days)” if he “was serious about disarming”. Council
members
“should be
able to agree the concept we were offering as a way out of the
current
252
Letter
Kennedy to Prime Minister, 12 July 2003, [untitled].
253
Telegram
419 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
254
Telegram
427 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Call on the
Secretary-General,
12
March’.
116