The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
250.
Evidence seen
by the Inquiry confirms that in January and February 2006 the
UK
stepped up
its efforts to encourage Iraq to form a broad and inclusive
government of
national
unity through high‑level visits and rounds of phone
calls.200
251.
Mr Straw
visited Basra and Baghdad in early January.201
He met
representatives
of
political parties from all the main communities, reinforcing the
UK’s message on
the need
for a unity government. In his view, achieving that mattered more
than who
became
Prime Minister.
252.
Some Sunni
representatives told Mr Straw that they had been “cheated out
of
seats”. He
responded that “they must accept the election results once
confirmed or they
will be
pitting themselves against the whole international
community”.
253.
Vice President
Adel Abdul Mehdi, a potential candidate for Prime Minister,
told
Mr Patey
on 1 January that “he would be ready to look at the possibility of
appointing
a judge
to head the de‑Ba’athification Commission” and to reduce the role
of politicians
254.
Prime Minister
Ja’afari told Mr Patey on 3 January that, although the Ba’ath
Party
and its
ideology should remain outlawed, “the half‑million former Ba’ath
members
Ja’afari
saw as his ‘children’ should not and the de‑Ba’athification
Commission and its
procedures
should be reviewed”.203
255.
On 3 January,
Mr Ayad Allawi told Mr Blair that in forming the new
government “the
key bridge
to the Sunnis would be revision of the de‑Ba’athification
process”.204
256.
An IPU brief
for Mr Straw’s visit to Baghdad in early April listed
“participation by all
(including
former Ba’athists) who are committed to furthering the political
process and
can run
government effectively” as one of the main issues for the new Iraqi
Government
257.
After the
announcement of Mr Nuri al‑Maliki as the nominee for Prime
Minister, the
British
Embassy Baghdad’s pen picture of him recorded that he had been
Deputy Chair
of the
de‑Ba’athification Commission and “a driving force for that body’s
work”.206
The
200
eGram
359/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Visit by
Foreign Secretary, 6‑7 January
2006:
Elections and Formatio[n]’; eGram 3684/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 22
February 2006, ‘Iraq:
Foreign
Secretary’s Visit, 20‑21 February 2006: Formation of Govern[ment]’;
Minute Bayley to Foreign
Secretary,
16 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Keeping Up The Momentum – Proposed
Telephone Calls/Visit’.
201
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 11 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Post‑Elections and
Government Formation’.
202
eGram 69/06
Baghdad to FCO London, 4 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Call on Vice
President Abdul Mehdi’.
203
eGram
129/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 4 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Call on Prime
Minister Ja’afari’.
204
Letter
Prentice to Quarrey, 3 January 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Iyad Allawi, Amman,
2 January’.
205
Briefing
IPU, 31 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Visit, 2‑3 April
2006’.
206
eGram
13011/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Formation of
the New Government:
al‑Maliki
Nominated by UIA as Prime Minister’.
48