The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

511. Before the joint minute from Mr Straw and Mr Hoon reached No.10, Mr Drummond

advised Mr Rycroft that “we need Ministers to decide on sectors”.326 He suggested that

they would want to agree the proposals in the joint minute:

“… provided they are satisfied that:

• UK forces will be capable of providing security for an area around Basra

including about 20 percent of Iraq’s population.

• How long we will have this responsibility, and what is the exit strategy (benign

security environment created, UK forces replaced by others). Will we be able

to limit ‘our area’ to say Basra by the autumn, when we want to withdraw two

thirds of our troops?”

512. After the Ministerial meeting on post-conflict issues on 21 March, Mr Rycroft

informed the FCO and MOD that Mr Blair agreed to the recommendations made by

Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, subject to further urgent advice on the size of any UK sector,

the duration of the UK commitment and the exit strategy.327

513. Treasury officials advised Mr Brown that the minute from Mr Straw to

Mr Hoon raised a number of issues, including that Treasury and MOD views

differed on the wisdom of the UK taking on command of a sector in Iraq without

“the necessary guarantees”.

514. Mr John Dodds, Head of the Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team in the

Treasury, sent advice on the Straw/Hoon joint minute to Mr Brown on 24 March.328

515. Mr Dodds told Mr Brown that US military planning appeared:

“… to have four ‘two-star commands (ie divisions)’ outside of Baghdad, focusing

more flexibly on the tasks that need to be done, rather than being tied down to

specific narrow locations.

“The MOD ambition is to have a UK-led ‘two-star [Maj Gen] command.’

516. Mr Dodds warned that the UK should not be too ready to take on a two-star

command in the aftermath without “the necessary guarantees”. The military would

“baulk” at this: “a ‘two-star command’ would provide a seat at the top table in the

aftermath”, but it carried the risk of costs “we cannot afford both militarily and financially”.

517. The FCO advised that it would not be possible to decide on the size of a

UK military sector before establishing the nature of the task and the scale of the

Coalition resources available.

326 Minute Drummond to Rycroft, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq Ministerial Meeting’.

327 Minute Rycroft to McDonald and Watkins, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to

Post‑Conflict Iraq’.

328 Minute Dodds to Chancellor, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to Post-Conflict Iraq’.

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