8 | The
invasion
388.
Mr Johnson
reported that 1 (UK) Div’s intention was that the entry into
Basra
would be:
“…
supported by information operations, to reassure the population and
isolate them
from regime
propaganda, and by humanitarian assistance … The combined
effect
should be
to build popular confidence in Coalition capabilities and
intentions …
News of the
US entry into Baghdad should reinforce this effect.”
389.
Mr Johnson
reminded Mr Hoon of the possible requirement for
subsequent
expansion
northwards to “take on and defeat Iraqi forces posing a potential
threat to
Basra, if
this was necessary to achieve a satisfactory outcome to Phase III
of the overall
campaign”.
He stated: “This issue may well arise in the near future.”
Mr Johnson also
advised:
“We therefore intend that GOC 1 (UK) Div should have flexibility to
move north
to defeat
these forces or accept their surrender, if required.”
390.
A second piece
of advice, sent to Mr Hoon’s Office later the same day,
reported a
proposal to
“recruit, arm and co-ordinate the activity of 20 Iraqis to support
1 (UK) Div
operations
in Basra”.237
The advice
recommended that Mr Hoon agree the proposal to
recruit
ex-regular soldiers to conduct reconnaissance into Basra, and to
attack personnel
linked to
Saddam Hussein’s regime, armed with weapons seized by Coalition
Forces.
The advice
said: “At the end of the operation, the volunteers would be asked
to return
their
weapons.”
391.
An update for
Sir David Manning provided by Mr Drummond on 6 April
reported
that a
Coalition air strike in Basra had “resulted in the deaths of
several top regime
figures”.238
UK raids
into the city the previous night had met “little
resistance”.
7 Armoured
Brigade “now have a lodgement well into the city, and, subject to
CFLCC
agreement,
will push further in today”. The plan for 3 Commando was “to push
in from
the
south-east”.
392.
UK forces
entered Basra in force on the night of 6/7 April.
393.
Mr Scarlett
told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 7 April that, in Basra, the hard
core
of the
militias had retreated into the old town, while senior party and
military figures were
reported to
be leaving the city or willing to surrender.239
Rumours of
the death of the
regional
military commander (Chemical Ali) were rife.
394.
Adm Boyce
reported that the British Division had entered Basra the previous
night:
“… in
force, following signs of impatience about the stand-off by the
local population
in the
light of diminishing Iraqi militia confidence. Resistance was
incoherent but still
dangerous;
locals were helping the Coalition inside the town.”
237
Minute
Flaherty to PS/Secretary of State [Defence] 5 April 2003, ‘Op
TELIC: Use of locally recruited
forces in
Basra’.
238
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 6 April 2003, ‘Iraq – Update Noon Sunday 6
April’.
239
Minutes, 7
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq meeting.
69