The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
472.
The Government
response, sent in February 2004, is described later in
this
Section.
473.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald discussed the ISG with Dr Rice in Washington
on
14 September.260
After the
meeting, he informed Mr Blair that the timing of the
ISG
Interim
Report was unclear, but it was said to be detailed and long. There
would be a
short pause
for analysis; Dr Kay would be obliged to brief Congressional
Committees
in private;
and there would be leaks. The Report was likely to:
•
confirm
Iraqi deception and Iraqi intention to restart a nuclear
weapons
programme
once sanctions were lifted;
•
confirm
Iraqi pursuit of ballistic and cruise missile programmes with
ranges well
beyond UN
limits;
•
provide
little new information on BW or CW, “though there are some
leads”.
474.
Sir Nigel
advised that there was a risk an Interim Report of that kind would
be
used to
show there had been no immediate threat from Iraqi WMD. He and Dr
Rice had
agreed that
handling should be low-key, stress the Interim Report’s preliminary
nature,
point out
the difficulty of amassing evidence, and note that the Report
showed Iraq had
been in
breach of UN resolutions.
475.
Sir Nigel
concluded:
“The idea
of an Interim Report was conceived when we thought there would be
more
to say in
the autumn. We are now stuck with it, and are not in control of its
use. We
can’t
suppress it – its existence is too widely known. Nor did I seek to
delay Kay’s
Congressional
meetings, or any public statement about the Report – this too
would
be likely
to leak. But it is possible that there will be a delay anyway – to
the week of
22 September,
or later. And we should avoid publication of a redacted version
and
go, if
possible, for something shorter. Do you
agree this approach?”
476.
Mr Hoon
discussed the ISG with Secretary Rumsfeld on
15 September.261
He observed
that the forthcoming Interim Report “looked as though it was not
going
to be
particularly exciting”. Mr Rumsfeld said that the process was
“chugging along”,
but the
real issue was whether the ISG had enough people. Mr Hoon
offered any further
support
that was needed.
477.
Mr Scarlett
discussed the ISG Interim Report and the UK proposals for handling
it
with a
senior US official on 15 September.262
260
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 14 September 2003, ‘Visit to
Washington’.
261
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 16 September 2003, ‘The Defence
Secretary’s Telephone Call with
Donald Rumsfeld
15 September 2003 – Iraq’.
262
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 15 September 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group:
Interim Report: Update’.
520