Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
472.  The Government response, sent in February 2004, is described later in this
Section.
The ISG Interim Report, 2 October 2003
473.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald discussed the ISG with Dr Rice in Washington on
14 September.260 After the meeting, he informed Mr Blair that the timing of the ISG
Interim Report was unclear, but it was said to be detailed and long. There would be a
short pause for analysis; Dr Kay would be obliged to brief Congressional Committees
in private; and there would be leaks. The Report was likely to:
confirm Iraqi deception and Iraqi intention to restart a nuclear weapons
programme once sanctions were lifted;
confirm Iraqi pursuit of ballistic and cruise missile programmes with ranges well
beyond UN limits;
provide little new information on BW or CW, “though there are some leads”.
474.  Sir Nigel advised that there was a risk an Interim Report of that kind would be
used to show there had been no immediate threat from Iraqi WMD. He and Dr Rice had
agreed that handling should be low-key, stress the Interim Report’s preliminary nature,
point out the difficulty of amassing evidence, and note that the Report showed Iraq had
been in breach of UN resolutions.
475.  Sir Nigel concluded:
“The idea of an Interim Report was conceived when we thought there would be more
to say in the autumn. We are now stuck with it, and are not in control of its use. We
can’t suppress it – its existence is too widely known. Nor did I seek to delay Kay’s
Congressional meetings, or any public statement about the Report – this too would
be likely to leak. But it is possible that there will be a delay anyway – to the week of
22 September, or later. And we should avoid publication of a redacted version and
go, if possible, for something shorter. Do you agree this approach?
476.  Mr Hoon discussed the ISG with Secretary Rumsfeld on 15 September.261
He observed that the forthcoming Interim Report “looked as though it was not going
to be particularly exciting”. Mr Rumsfeld said that the process was “chugging along”,
but the real issue was whether the ISG had enough people. Mr Hoon offered any further
support that was needed.
477.  Mr Scarlett discussed the ISG Interim Report and the UK proposals for handling it
with a senior US official on 15 September.262
260  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 14 September 2003, ‘Visit to Washington’.
261  Letter Williams to Rycroft, 16 September 2003, ‘The Defence Secretary’s Telephone Call with
Donald Rumsfeld 15 September 2003 – Iraq’.
262  Minute Scarlett to Sheinwald, 15 September 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group: Interim Report: Update’.
520
Previous page | Contents | Next page