3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
{{destroy
all Al Samoud 2 missiles and components; and
{{account
for the purpose of all UAV and RPV programmes.33
106.
The draft side
statement was also sent to President Lagos.
107.
Sir David
informed Dr Rice that Mr Blair was willing to consider a
redraft of
operative
paragraph (OP) 3 of the draft resolution (tabled by the UK, US and
Spain
on 7 March),
which “might read”:
“decides
that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity unless by
X date it
shows that
it has demonstrated that it is co-operating fully, unconditionally
and
immediately
with its disarmament obligations under UNSCR 1441.”
108.
The decision
on Iraq’s co-operation would be taken on the basis of Iraq’s
response
to the six
tests.
109.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that President Bush and his military were
concerned
about
delay:
“It [the
proposal for tests/more time] was indeed a hard sell to George. His
system
was
completely against it. His military were, not unreasonably, fearing
that delay
gave the
enemy time – and time could mean a tougher struggle and more lives
lost.
This was
also troubling my military. We had all sorts of contingency plans
in place
for what
Saddam might do. He might set the oilfields on fire, release
chemical, or
worse,
biological material, or attack Israel. His past record gave us no
confidence in
his
trustworthiness or his humanity. There was both UK and US
intelligence warning
us of the
risk.
“Nonetheless
I thought it was worth a try …
“I set out
my case for delay in a Note to George. We then had a call. It was
tricky but
I laid it
on the line and reluctantly he agreed. We got the document prepared
with the
Blix
people. It had five crucial tests in it. It would, especially on
the interview, have
flushed out
the regime thoroughly on what they were hiding and on whether
they
had any
good faith.
“Chile and
Mexico were prepared to go along, but only up to a point. Ricardo
made
it clear
that if there was heavy opposition from France, it would be tough
for them to
participate
in what would then be a token vote, incapable of being passed
because
of a veto –
and what’s more, a veto not by Russia, but by France.
“Unfortunately,
the French position had, if anything, got harder not softer.
They
were
starting to say they would not support military action in any
circumstances,
irrespective
of what the inspectors found …”34
33
Letter
Manning to Rice, 10 March 2003, [untitled].
34
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
419