10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
235.
The UK
Treasury advised that the main problem with the US proposal was
that it
assumed a
certain interim governance arrangement for post-conflict Iraq which
had not
yet been
endorsed internationally. The “best outcome” for the UK would
be:
“… a
UN-authorised Transitional Administration or Iraqi Government,
accompanied
by a
‘Consultative Group’ of donors … chaired by the World
Bank.
“Initially
oil funds might continue to be managed under the Oil-for-Food
programme.
Gradually,
and as sanctions are lifted, the UN-backed Iraqi authority would
take
control of
domestic resources under suitable safeguards, e.g. over
transparency
of fiscal
actions, contracts etc.”
236.
Mr Rycroft
commented:
“We need to
get the US back to what they said at Camp David was their
policy:
returning
Iraqi sovereignty to Iraqi people.”
237.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush later that day.124
Mr Blair
stated that a clearer
picture was
needed of the shape of a post-Saddam Iraq to “sketch out a
political and
economic
future and dispel the myth that we were out to grab Iraq’s
oil”.
238.
After the
discussion, Mr Blair sent President Bush two Notes, one
on
communications
and one entitled ‘Reconstruction’.125
239.
The Note on
reconstruction set out the UK’s response to the two funds
proposed
by the US.
It stated that using the World Bank and the IMF to administer the
funds was
sensible
but would run into problems:
•
Channelling
oil revenues through IFIs rather than straight to the IIA could
“easily
be
misrepresented”, and the proposal would need to be included in the
next
resolution.
•
Without UN
agreement, the IFIs were unlikely to agree to administer the
funds.
•
The UK,
Japan and others could only unblock assets with UN
authority.
•
“Our
posture should be for the IIA to take on responsibility as soon as
possible,
i.e. Iraq
for the Iraqis, not us or the UN.”
240.
The Note
stated that an amended proposal had been submitted by the
UK
Treasury,
which envisaged some oil revenues going into a gradually declining
OFF
programme
and the remainder (plus unfrozen assets) going into “the
reconstruction
account”,
which would be administered jointly by the IMF and World Bank.
Funds from
the account
would be “directed to the IIA”.
124
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 31 March’.
125
Letter
Manning to Rice, 31 March 2003, [untitled] attaching Notes [Blair
to Bush], [undated],
‘Reconstruction’
and ‘Communications’.
409