The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

87. On 3 May, Mr Ricketts sent a very slightly amended definition of the end state,

agreed by Mr Straw, to Mr Webb:

“A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with

the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to

international security, and abiding by its international obligations on control of

its WMD.”44

The previous reference to “global security” was replaced by “international security”.

88. Mr Ricketts added:

• If the end state were to be used “as a public justification for military action”,

it would be “necessary to add whatever legal base was approved by the

Attorney General”.

• “For the record, the Foreign Secretary was strongly against any specific

reference to ‘regime change’.”

89. Mr Webb’s response of 10 May recorded that there was some discussion in the

Pigott Group about the language on WMD on the grounds that a follow-on regime

might only be happy if it retained some WMD as long as its neighbours continued to

do the same.45 He suggested that the end state should be amended to “abiding by its

international obligations on WMD”.

90. On the question of legal justification, Mr Webb noted Mr Straw’s caution but added:

“I presume … we are all still working to the line in the Prime Minister’s Crawford

speech that it might become justified and necessary. Consistent with that we see

it as a likely – though not certain – way point in a campaign to secure the strategic

objective. Following the meeting we have proposed to the Defence Secretary we

take forward rapidly two distinct pieces of work, one on military contingency planning

… and the other on coalition options which will need to factor in legal considerations.

Rather than submitting our Ministers’ conclusions to the Attorney General for his

approval, we should prefer the usual approach of his putting advice to colleagues

as part of a collective decision.”

91. When Mr Webb visited Washington in mid-May, he discussed draft objectives with

US officials.46 His report of US views included:

• The elimination of WMD by Iraq should be a firm objective. The view that an Iraq

government was unlikely to stay in office if it could not provide a counter-weight

to an Iran which had a WMD capability was discounted.

44 Letter Ricketts to Webb, 3 May 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency planning’.

45 Letter Webb to Ricketts, 10 May 2002, [untitled].

46 Minute Webb to Ricketts, 16 May 2002, ‘Iraq: Objectives’.

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