The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
as per
Bush’s remarks about taking the battle to the enemy, taking him on
before
he takes
us on …
“Jack set
out the political difficulties. He said it was all being driven by
DOD and the
NSC, and
[Secretary] Powell and the State Department was not fully involved
…
“TB said he
did not want any discussions with any other departments at this
stage
and did not
want any of this ‘swimming round the system’. He meant the Treasury
…
“Jack said
of the four powers posing a potential threat with WMD … Iraq would
be
fourth. He
does not have nukes, he has some offensive WMD capability. The
tough
question is
whether this is just regime change or is the issue
WMD.
“TB was
pretty clear that we had to be with the Americans. He said at one
point,
‘It’s worse
than you think, I actually believe in doing this.’ He was acutely
conscious
how
difficult it would be both with the PLP and the public, but when
Jack raised
the
prospect of not going in with the US, TB said that would be the
biggest shift
in foreign
policy for fifty years and I’m not sure it’s very
wise.
“On the
tactical level, he felt maximum closeness publicly was the way to
maximise
influence
privately …
“TB said he
needed to be convinced first of the workability of the military
plan, and
second of
an equally workable political strategy. Jack said we could probably
get the
votes for a
UN ultimatum, but the Americans may not want to go down that
route.
TB saw
regime change as the route to dealing with WMD.”136
347.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair recorded that Adm Boyce had made it pretty clear at
the
meeting
that “he thought the US had decided on it [military action], bar a
real change
348.
In his memoir
published in 2007, Mr Tenet wrote that Sir Richard Dearlove had
told
him that he
had been misquoted.138
Sir Richard
had objected in particular to the word
“fixed” and
offered a correction. Mr Tenet wrote that he had been told Sir
Richard had:
“…
expressed the view … that the war in Iraq was going to happen. He
believed the
momentum
driving it was not really about WMD but rather about bigger issues
such
as changing
the politics of the Middle East.”
349.
Mr Tenet added
that Sir Richard:
“… recalled
that he had a polite, but significant, disagreement with Scooter
Libby
[Chief of
Staff to Vice President Cheney], who was trying to convince him
that
136
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
137
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
138
Tenet G
& Harlow B. At the
Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA.
HarperPress, 2007.
62