6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
730.
The British
Embassy Washington reported the outcome of a call on ORHA and
the
NSC by Dr
Brewer on 27 February. Thinking on the UN was evolving. The US
accepted
it would
need technical help with humanitarian and reconstruction work and
was showing
growing
acceptance of an international civilian administrator backed by a
UN mandate,
but
remained opposed to a direct reporting line to the
UN.318
731.
Separately,
the Embassy suggested giving more support to ORHA. It
would
be vital to
the long-term success of UK action in Iraq and any assistance would
be
“gratefully
received and effectively used”. So far three staff had been
provided, including
Maj Gen Cross.
That was “a drop in the bucket”. The Embassy suggested staff
already
earmarked
for posting to Baghdad might be one source.319
732.
The secondment
of UK officials to ORHA is addressed in Section 15.
733.
Mr Straw
spoke to Secretary Powell on 3 March (see Section 3.7). He
reported
to No.10
that, in the context of a discussion about the lack of serious
planning for
post‑conflict,
he had told Secretary Powell that, “whilst the US Administration
had to be
the best
judge of its long term interests”, he “thought it would reap a
whirlwind if it failed
to secure
legitimacy for what it was doing in respect of Iraq. We were not
there yet.”320
734.
By 4 March,
senior members of the US Administration were said to
have
accepted
the need for a Security Council mandate, a role for the UN after
the initial
military
occupation and the need for a UN Special Co-ordinator.
735.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Washington,
reported
overnight
on 3/4 March that senior members of the US Administration had
accepted the
need for a
Security Council mandate, a role for the UN after the initial
military occupation
and the
need for a UN Special Co-ordinator, although there were differing
views over
how the UN
figure would relate to an Iraqi Interim Council.321
The US
hoped to organise
a “Bonn
Conference” on the Afghan model, four to six weeks after the
invasion, involving
external
opposition figures and tribal leaders from inside Iraq. The
conference would
produce an
administrative council, which would gradually take on authority
over a period
of months
as it moved Iraq towards elections or a constituent assembly.
Mr Brenton
reported
that he had underlined to the US the UK’s wish to see a structure
which brought
international
legitimacy and buy-in, and had expressed “polite scepticism” about
the
qualities
of those members of the external opposition best known to the
UK.
318
Telegram
256 Washington to FCO London, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: US
Views on UN Role’.
319
Telegram
257 Washington to FCO London, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: UK
Role in Post-Conflict
Iraq’.
320
Letter
Straw to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 3 March’.
321
Telegram
284 Washington to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
443