The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1058.
The minutes of
the meeting recorded:
“In the
short term, pressure on Rotary Wing (RW) assets in Afghanistan and
Iraq
could only
be alleviated by releasing assets from other tasks, or by
extracting
more from
the assets in theatre. The situation was complicated by
differences
between
helicopters in lift and Defensive Aids Suites (DAS) … In addition
the paper
recognised
that any increase in helicopter flying hours would be limited by
the
availability
of spares, crew hours and harmony guidelines …”
1059.
In discussion,
ACM Stirrup stressed that the Chiefs of Staff “needed to
focus
on the
problem they faced between now and the end of the year. The UK was
fighting
a war in
two theatres which demanded urgent innovative work to deliver
capability
quickly,
rather than waiting for a 100 percent (or even 80 percent) solution
over a longer
timeframe.”
1060.
Amongst the
measures agreed by the Chiefs of Staff were taking greater
risk
on other
operations to release assets for use in Iraq and Afghanistan and
taking
“further
action with our Allies” to ensure that their helicopter assets
remained in theatre,
specifically
the US and Italians.
1061.
The Chiefs of
Staff also agreed that additional resources were to be
identified
in the next
planning round to deliver an improved rotary wing capability. That
would
include:
•
the “fix to
field” requirement for the eight Chinook Mk3s (see Box, ‘The
eight
modified
Chinooks’);
•
the
provision of Defensive Aids Suites across the deployable helicopter
fleet
so that
it was “adaptable to the changing threat”;
•
support
helicopter lift over the next five years; and
•
support
helicopter and attack helicopter sustainability over the next five
years.
1062.
On ISTAR the
Chiefs agreed:
•
Merlin Mk1
should replace Nimrod in Oman, freeing Nimrod to
“ameliorate
ISTAR
shortfalls elsewhere”;
•
Predator B
“represented the most coherent ISTAR capability for the UK’s
needs”
and should
be procured “as soon as possible” for use in Afghanistan, but
without
prejudice
to the Watchkeeper programme; and
•
a PJHQ‑led
ISTAR Task Team should identify theatre‑specific ISTAR
requirements
and how the UK might better utilise the entire coalition
theatre
ISTAR
process. Air Marshal Stuart Peach, Chief of Defence Intelligence,
would
lead that
work with a view to informing the EP/STP07 by 1 October
2006.
1063.
ACM Stirrup
asked Gen Granville‑Chapman to produce an action plan to
deliver
the
measures agreed on rotary wing and ISTAR “as a matter of urgency”
by 7 July.
180