10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
The US
also wanted to make clear that military operations would not be
paid for out of
Iraqi oil
money.
176.
Ms Patricia
Hewitt, the Trade and Industry Secretary, wrote to Mr Blair
on
13 March
seeking confirmation that she could, if necessary, signal the UK’s
agreement
to the
release of a modest amount of the IEA’s oil stocks, to reassure oil
markets.91
She described
the oil markets as “extremely nervous”.
177.
No.10 replied
the following day, confirming that while Mr Blair agreed the
broad
approach
proposed, he would like to be consulted before any final decision
was taken.92
178.
On 14 March,
the FCO instructed the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in
New
York to
start discussions with the US delegation on a possible resolution
to modify the
OFF
programme and sanctions regime in the event of military action and
the absence of
an
“effective Iraqi Government”.93
The FCO
believed that that resolution might best be
tabled
immediately after the start of military operations.
179.
The UK wanted
the OFF programme to continue “for some time”, to enable Iraq
to
export oil
and import and distribute humanitarian goods until new government
structures
existed
that could take on those functions.
180.
The FCO
proposed that to enable the OFF programme to continue, the
UN
Secretary-General
should fulfil a number of functions that were currently reserved
for the
Iraqi
Government, including the authority to spend OFF programme
funds.
181.
The UK
position was summarised in the FCO background papers for the
Azores
Summit,
sent to No.10 on 15 March:
“If the
Iraqi regime falls, new arrangements will need to be put in place
to enable
the OFF to
keep functioning. Our current plan is to table a resolution soon
after
conflict
starts, transferring authority for ordering and distributing goods
to the
UN Secretary‑General
… [W]e would hope that the Secretary-General would be
able to
transfer full control over oil revenues to a properly
representative Iraqi
Government
as soon as possible (not as the US have suggested, an Iraqi
‘entity’,
which
could, particularly if US appointed, fuel suggestions that the
Coalition was
seeking to
control Iraqi oil).”94
91
Minute
Hewitt to Blair, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq and the oil
market’.
92
Letter
Jones to Zimmer, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq and the oil
market’.
93
Telegram
149 FCO London to UKMIS New York, 14 March 2003, Iraq – Military
Action – Sanctions and
Oil for
Food – Strategy Paper.
94
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 15 March 2003, ‘Azores Summit’ attaching Paper FCO,
‘Iraq – Oil for Food
Programme
(OFF) and Sanctions’.
401