10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
“Any
military presence, should it be necessary, will be temporary and
intended to
promote
security and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the
delivery of
humanitarian
aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction of Iraq. Our
commitment
to support
the people of Iraq will be for the long term.”
10.
On 25 March,
Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of the Cabinet Office
Overseas
and Defence
Secretariat (OD Sec), sent a draft paper to senior officials in the
Foreign
and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the
Department
for
International Development (DFID) setting out “British Post-Conflict
Objectives”.3
11.
The draft
included Mr Straw’s formulation of 7 January,
adding:
“Our
objective is to create conditions for a future Iraqi government
which will act to
make this
aspiration a reality. We will work with the Iraqi people, the UN
and other
international
organisations, and the wider international community to this
end.”
“British
forces will continue to contribute, for no longer than is necessary
at a
sustainable
level, to the US-led Coalition military presence in the interests
of
promoting a
secure environment in Iraq …
“We have
made plans with our international partners to assist the Iraqi
people
in the process
of transition. With others, we will assist in the return to full
Iraqi
sovereignty
…
“With
others, we will help revive the Iraqi economy and assist reform
by:
•
working
with the UN to manage Iraq’s oil revenues in order to
achieve
the maximum
benefit for the Iraqi people in an accountable and
transparent manner;
•
supporting
an international programme for the reconstruction and
repair
of
Iraq’s infrastructure …;
•
fostering
economic reform …;
•
agreeing a
comprehensive financial framework of transitional
support
for Iraq …;
•
helping
reform Iraq’s public administration …;
•
supporting
the observance of human rights, and legal and judicial reform
…;
•
helping
Iraq generate reformed and accountable security forces acting
in
accordance
with international human rights standards.”
13.
There is no
indication that the objectives were ever adopted
formally.
3
Letter
Bowen to Chaplin, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post Conflict Objectives’
attaching Paper [draft],
25 March
2003, ‘Iraq: British Post-Conflict Objectives’.
5