The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
told the
Vice President that President Bush was “concerned that your speech
is being
read as a
decision to skip the UN and challenge Saddam
unilaterally”.57
169.
Sir David
Manning was contacted by Dr Rice on 28 August.58
She stressed
that,
despite the
statements and articles over the previous few days, the US position
had not
changed.
President Bush was “determined to build international support for
action on
Iraq” and
believed it was possible:
“He was
working on the ‘UN route’, and planned to use his UNGA speech
to
challenge
the international community to deal with the Saddam threat. He
was
thinking of
proposing that the UN should pass a further tough resolution
demanding
wide‑ranging
disarmament measures from Saddam. If he accepted them (which
she
thought
unlikely) Saddam would be forced to run Iraq in a completely
different way.”
170.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that Mr Blair “too, remained in the same
place”, and that the
UK “well
understood the recent difficulties”. They “pointed to the need for
a core script
we could
all stick to”. Dr Rice had agreed.
171.
Sir David
also said that a “clear line of action” was needed. Challenging
and
encouraging
the international community to deal with Iraq through the UN
“sounded
exactly the
right course”. If the context was right, “action would become much
easier”.
He
added:
“Action
through the UN would do much to change the profile of the problem.
If the
UN route
succeeded, well and good. If it did not, we would at least have
tried to work
with the
international community. And anyone who blocked effective action in
the UN
would not
only have to explain why, but … what they would do
instead.”
172.
Dr Rice
agreed; President Bush wanted to speak to Mr Blair the next
day. Sir David
and
Dr Rice also discussed a meeting, possibly on 11
September.
173.
Sir David
commented to Mr Blair that the discussion:
“… was
encouraging. The signs are that Bush is now thinking of opting for
a coalition
strategy
that takes account of the UN (though probably on pretty tough
terms).
I was
particularly struck by Condi’s remark that Saddam would have to run
Iraq
in a
different way if he signed up to proper disarmament measures. The
fact that
the
Administration is now conceptualising this thought, rather than
reiterating its
commitment
to regime change irrespective of Saddam’s behaviour, is
significant.
“… My sense
is that he [President Bush] will be keen to know that he still has
your
support;
and keen to know that you approve of his plans to work through the
UN.
I am
sure you should encourage him strongly.
57
Rice
C. No Higher
Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. Simon
& Schuster, 2011.
58
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 28 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
124