10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
Mr Benn
gave evidence to the International Development Committee (IDC)
on
10 March 2005,
as part of its inquiry into development assistance to
Iraq.145
His
hearing
followed a
visit by three members of the IDC (Mr Quentin Davies,
Mr Tony Colman and
Ms Ann
Clwyd) to Iraq.
Mr Davies
reported that he had been struck by the progress made in
reconstruction and
building
Iraqi capacity, and by the “very good” co-operation between DFID
and the military
on the
ground. He challenged Mr Benn on two issues. First, that the
separate budgets
held by
DFID and the MOD for reconstruction could lead to “some muddle”.
Second, that
some of
DFID’s work to build the capacity of the Iraqi Government was
inconsistent with
the 2002
International Development Act.
Mr Benn
welcomed the IDC’s observation that DFID and the MOD were working
well
together on
the ground. He commented:
“DFID has
come into Iraq and done things that traditionally we would not do …
Why?
Because
that was what was required in the circumstances. We had to dust
down
some skills
and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit [PCRU] is one of the
lessons
from this
…”
The PCRU
and its role in Iraq is described in Section 10.3.
Mr Benn
strongly rejected the charge that some of DFID’s work was
inconsistent with
the 2002
International Development Act, arguing that capacity-building was
crucial for
poverty
reduction:
“… having
states that work … governments that can do their job, is
absolutely
fundamental
to improving services and the lives of poor people.”
The
imminent dissolution of Parliament brought the inquiry to a close.
The IDC did not
publish a
report, but did publish the evidence it had gathered as part of its
inquiry.
The IDC did
not undertake another inquiry into the UK’s reconstruction effort
in Iraq.
250.
Gen Riley
reported on 16 March that he was “still worried” about
providing
sufficient
power across MND(SE) over the summer.146
Temperatures
were already
creeping
up, and he remembered the “near-disaster” in summer 2003 caused by
the
failure of
essential services.147
145
Seventh
Report from the International Development Committee, Session
2004-2005, Development
assistance in
Iraq: Interim Report,
HC244.
146
Report
Riley, 16 March 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 16
March 2005’.
147 A
reference to the riots in Basra on 10/11 August 2003, which the UK
assessed were triggered by fuel
shortages
and power blackouts.
237