7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
11.
In the
Inquiry’s view, the diplomatic options had not at that stage
been
exhausted.
Military action was therefore not a last resort.
12.
In
mid-March, Mr Blair’s determination to stand alongside the US
left the UK
with a
stark choice. It could act with the US but without the support of
the majority
of the
Security Council in taking military action if Saddam Hussein did
not accept
the US
ultimatum giving him 48 hours to leave. Or it could choose not to
join
US‑led
military action.
13.
Led by
Mr Blair, the UK Government chose to support military
action.
14.
Mr Blair
asked Parliament to endorse a decision to invade and occupy
a
sovereign
nation, without the support of a Security Council resolution
explicitly
authorising
the use of force. Parliament endorsed that choice.
15.
This
Section sets out how the choices made by the UK Government
resulted
in that
outcome.
16.
President Bush
decided at the end of 2001 to pursue a policy of regime
change
in Iraq.
17.
The UK shared
the broad objective of finding a way to deal with Saddam
Hussein’s
defiance of
UN Security Council resolutions and his assumed weapons of
mass
destruction
(WMD) programmes. However, based on consistent legal advice, the
UK
could not
share the US objective of regime change. The UK Government
therefore set
as its
objective the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with the
obligations imposed in
a series
of Security Council resolutions.
18.
Before the
attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the UK was
pursuing
a strategy
of containment based on a new sanctions regime to improve
international
support and
incentivise Iraq’s co-operation, narrowing and deepening the
sanctions
regime to
focus only on prohibited items and at the same time improving
financial
controls to
reduce the flow of illicit funds to Saddam Hussein.
19.
When UK policy
towards Iraq was formally reviewed and agreed by the
Ministerial
Committee
on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) in May 1999, the objectives
towards
Iraq were
defined as:
“… in the
short term, to reduce the threat Saddam [Hussein] poses to the
region
including
by eliminating his weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programmes;
573