The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
780.
There is no
record of whether the text of the draft resolution and its effect
were
discussed
at that meeting.
781.
Lord Goldsmith
drew the Inquiry’s attention to a copy of Mr Grainger’s
note
of 4
November in the files of the Attorney General’s Office, which had
“a manuscript
reference”
in the margin of OP4 which read: “and will be reported to SC
[Security
Council]
for assessment in acc with para [11+]12”.263
782.
Lord Goldsmith
told the Inquiry that:
“… it is
not clear when that manuscript note was made. In any event I do not
believe
that I saw
it and there was no request to advise on the effect of the words. I
feel
reasonably
confident that if I had been asked about those words I would have
said
that they
were problematic and would have argued for their removal. In the
event,
when I came
to advise on the text after it was adopted, the words became of
central
importance
and caused me much difficulty.”264
783.
In a
conversation with President Bush on 6 November, Mr Blair
reiterated
his view
that the clear message to Saddam Hussein must be that, if there
were
a further
breach by Iraq, action should follow.
784.
Mr Blair
telephoned President Bush on 6 November primarily to discuss
Iraq.265
785.
The UK/US
draft resolution was to be circulated later that day and
Mr Blair
welcomed
its provisions for a tough inspections regime. Mr Blair and
President Bush
also
discussed making statements after the resolution had been adopted
and the
messages
that would send to Saddam Hussein.
786.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that there was a chance, albeit a small one,
that under
the
pressure and humiliation of inspections the regime might crumble.
They “must play
into that”
and “be very tough, to encourage regime members to split off”.
A psychological
profile
would be useful.
“… there
must be a clear understanding that if there were a further breach
action
must
follow; we should imply, without spelling it out, that if there
were a veto in those
circumstances,
there would still be action.”
788.
In his
subsequent conversation with Dr Rice, Sir David Manning
reported that
Mr Blair
had told the President that he would point to the commitment in the
resolution
263
Note
(handwritten) Grainger to Brummell, 4 November 2002, attaching text
of US draft resolution.
264
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 1.7.
265
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 6 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with Bush,
6 November’.
334