The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
supervision”
by the IAEA. Key personnel who used to work on the
nuclear
weapons
programme were “back in harness”. Saddam Hussein had
also:
{{“bought
or was attempting to buy” items that could have a use in a
nuclear
programme;
and
{{“been
trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa,
although
we do not
know whether he has been successful”.
•
Iraq’s
ballistic missile programme was required for the delivery of its
chemical,
biological
and nuclear weapons, and “a significant number of
longer‑range
missiles
were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and
remain,
including
up to 20 extended‑range SCUD missiles”. In mid‑2001 there
had
been a step
change in the programme; “development of weapons with
a
range of
more than 1,000km was well under way; and … hundreds of
people
are
employed in that programme”. The capability being developed was
“for
multi‑purpose
use, including with WMD warheads”.
179.
Mr Blair
stated that: “In addition, we have well founded intelligence to
tell us
that Saddam
Hussein sees his WMD programme as vital to his survival and as
a
demonstration
of his power and influence in the region.”
“There will
be some who dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For
some
of the
material, there might be innocent explanations. There will be
others who say
rightly
that … it could be several years before Saddam acquires a usable
nuclear
weapon –
though if he were able to purchase fissile material … it would be
only
a year
or two.”
181.
In the light
of the information he had set out, Mr Blair asked whether the
world
would be
wise to trust to the “good faith of the current Iraqi regime”.
Mr Blair added:
“Our case
is simply this: not that we take military action come what may,
but
that the
case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament, as the UN itself has
stipulated,
is overwhelming.
I defy anyone, on the basis of this evidence, to say that
that
is an unreasonable
demand for the international community to make when,
after all, it is
only the same demand that we have made for 11 years and
that
Saddam has
rejected.”
182.
Mr Blair
posed, and addressed, three questions: ‘”Why Saddam?”; “Why
now?”;
and “Why
should Britain care?”.
183.
On the
question “Why Saddam?”, Mr Blair said two things about Saddam
Hussein
stood out:
“He had used these weapons in Iraq” and thousands had died, and he
had
used them
during the war with Iran “in which one million people died”; and
the regime
had “no
moderate elements to appeal to”.
230