4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
•
Chemical
warfare agents: UBL’s group
was “assessed to have acquired a
limited and
unsophisticated chemical capability” and had been “reported at
one
stage to
have seen potential use in assassinations and other attacks in
small,
confined
spaces. But given time they might develop such ideas into plans
to
cause large
numbers of casualties.”
•
Some
biological warfare agents: Intelligence
had indicated that “UBL and
other
Islamic extremists” had “shown an interest in BW agents and their
effects”.
•
Radiological
dispersal devices: There was
“a considerable body of
intelligence
relating to trafficking in illicit nuclear materials, and
intelligence that
UBL
possesses a small quantity of uranium. The use of uranium in a
radiological
dispersal
device is extremely ineffective, and does not present anything
other
than the
most minor of radiological hazards.”
•
Improvised
nuclear device: This would
be “harder to design and build than
a
radiological dispersal device. […] Such a device would be large,
fragile and
probably
unreliable. It would need to be delivered by a vehicle or boat,
or
assembled
in situ. […] Acquiring the fissile material (plutonium or highly
enriched
uranium)
would be the major obstacle. No terrorists have the ability to
make
fissile
materials, and we have no evidence that any have acquired enough
for a
weapon. A
terrorist with explosives expertise could detonate a nuclear
weapon
acquired
from a nuclear-armed state, although it is unlikely to give its
intended
yield, if
any.” There was “no credible intelligence to suggest that UBL or
any
other
terrorist had acquired a nuclear device from the former Soviet
Union”.
131.
The Assessment
stated that the forms of possible attack from those threats
were:
“… not new
in themselves. We assessed in 1990 that Iraq could use chemical
and
biological
agents in covert attacks on western countries as well as in
conflict. But
the 11
September attacks highlight the risk that extremist groups might
turn to these
means of
attack in order to maximise death and disruption. Unlike states –
in most
circumstances
– such terrorists cannot be deterred by the prospect of
retaliation.
“Terrorists
have already shown they can cause mass casualties by
conventional
means … The
difficulties in making or using chemical, biological, radiological
or
nuclear
weapons (CBRN), though by no means insurmountable, may make
those
options
less attractive to them. But CW and especially BW agents have the
potential
to produce
casualties in excess of those seen in New York. Hence any use, or
threat
of use …
would generate a degree of terror and panic out of proportion to
the low
probability
of a successful major attack.”
132.
Addressing who
might have the capability and intent to threaten the UK,
the
Assessment
stated that Islamist extremists had the “motivation to attack the
West” and
their means
of operation made them “particularly difficult to identify and
disrupt”. The
US was
“their main target”. Most Islamic extremists had not targeted the
UK “to date”,
but “the
UK, France, Israel and ‘the West’ generally” were a “second rank in
their
list of priorities”.
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