The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

29. Sir David pointed out that Iraq had not used chemical or biological agents during

the 1991 Gulf Conflict, but he was unsure whether that was because Iraq did not have

the capability or for other reasons. He was:

“… anyway left very uneasy by Mike Boyce’s suggestion that the Americans

believe that Saddam would only use CBW as a last resort. If this is the American

assessment, it strikes me as alarmingly complacent. Saddam will know that once

the US launches an attack, the game is up. From his point of view, it will be last

resort time from the moment the first Marines hit the beach. And with all the wisdom

of the armchair strategist, it seems to me that the temptation to let fly at the Kuwait

bottleneck, with everything in his armoury, could be very strong indeed.”

30. Mr Scarlett was also asked to “do more work on regime cohesion” in the light

of what Sir David described as “a risk of American wishful thinking”.

31. Mr Scarlett subsequently provided a list of points on Iraq, to which he believed

answers were needed, for Sir David Manning to use during his visit to Washington

(see Section 3.3).13 The points on Iraq’s WMD were:

“• Iraq’s CBW and ballistic missile capability …

• Saddam’s ‘red lines’ which would provoke him to use CBW against Coalition

Forces or his neighbours.

• What would be the Israeli response to an Iraqi CBW attack?”

32. A JIC Assessment addressing Sir David Manning’s questions about Iraq’s military

capabilities was produced on 9 September. That is addressed later in this Section.

33. On 29 July, Sir David Manning delivered to Dr Rice a Note from Mr Blair

to President Bush.

34. Mr Blair sent President Bush a “Note on Iraq” dated 28 July which was intended to

influence President Bush’s thinking on Iraq.14 The Note and the subsequent discussions

between Sir David Manning and senior members of the US Administration, including

President Bush, and Mr Blair’s own discussion with President Bush, are addressed

in Section 3.3.

35. Mr Blair’s Note included six elements for “A Strategy for Achieving a Coalition”.

13 Minute Scarlett to Manning, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq: We do not know enough about …’.

14 Note Blair [to Bush], 28 July 2002, ‘Note on Iraq’.

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