The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
174.
Prime Minister
Allawi’s Legal Adviser told Mr Hood that the new Order
had
been
drafted on the instructions of Prime Minister Allawi, who judged
that returning to
public
service might prevent thousands of disaffected former Ba’athists
supporting the
insurgency.
The philosophy behind the Order was “punish an individual for their
crimes
and not
their ideology”. It had been approved by the Council of Ministers
but not yet by
the
President and was unlikely to be signed before the
election.
175.
The draft
Order, which Mr Hood was not shown, was said to:
•
disband the
de‑Ba’athification Commission;
•
allow all
those removed by the CPA to return to their posts, unless that post
was
judged to
be sensitive or senior (Director General and above) or they were
found
to have
committed a “crime against the Iraqi people” (undefined);
and
•
establish a
new judicial Commission to investigate allegations of such
crimes.
“Allawi
right to see some modification of the de‑Ba’athification process as
a
necessary
part of promoting national unity, but amending the rules can only
be
credibly
done by some form of elected government and preferably as part of a
wider
initiative
on transitional justice.”
177.
In the form
described, the Embassy judged that the Order would “lead to an
outcry
from across
Iraqi society” with vigilantism expected to follow.
178.
After visiting
Iraq in December 2004, Mr Dominic Asquith, FCO Iraq
Director,
commented
that in order to achieve political reconstruction and Iraqiisation
by early
2006:
“One answer
is gradually to incorporate – if necessary into the less
sensitive
areas to
begin with – experienced Ba’athists (ex or otherwise) prepared to
opt into
government
and security structures, separating ‘those who served’ from ‘those
who
served the
previous regime’, while ensuring the appointments survive the
transition
to the new
government. Established vetting procedures will be key, but the
work
done by
British experts in CPA days has strangely disappeared from
view.”147
179.
In January
2005, the Defence Intelligence Staff judged:
“Within the
Arab Sunni community there are a number of former senior
military
officers
and Ba’ath Party officials who remain intrinsically opposed to
anything other
than the
full restoration of the Ba’ath Party and, in many cases, their own
positions
of power.
Prominent among this group are the New Regional Command (NRC),
but
there are
probably further independent actors and organisations not yet
identified …
147
Minute
Asquith to Owen, 20 December 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq, 13‑17
December’.
36