The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
187.
Maj Gen Shaw
wrote that he had presented three tests “by which the viability of
the
deal might
be judged”:
“–
IDF
attacks on COB [Contingency Operating Base] and BP [Basra
Palace].
–
the
safety of convoys from a week’s time re-posturing from
BP.
–
the
safety of BP once it became a GoI property.
“The more
he succeeded against these tests, the more he would show that he
can
deliver,
that this deal works to the advantage of MNF and is no threat,
indeed is
supportive
of GoI. All of which would give my successor confidence to continue
with
the
deal.”
188.
The senior
government official reported that JAM1 had made clear that,
when
violence
reduced, additional detainee releases would be his priority; he
would need
releases
from across the Basra political and militia spectrum to avoid other
groups
disrupting
the process.84
He hoped
for releases at a rate of 10 to 20 a month. The
transfer of
any detainees to US custody would end the initiative: this was a
red line.
189.
The senior
official commented that while JAM1’s recognition of the wider
political
context in
Basra was encouraging, it was tangible improvement on the ground
that
would
matter. Maj Gen Shaw had established a working group in Basra, to
be chaired by
his
successor, Maj Gen Binns. The group would meet regularly to review
progress and
the talks
with JAM1, producing a report to be sent up the MNF-I chain of
command to
Gen
Petraeus and to Lt Gen Rollo, Mr Christopher Prentice (who
would be succeeding
Mr Asquith
as British Ambassador to Iraq), the MOD and the FCO. MND(SE) would
keep
Gen Mohan
informed; Lt Gen Rollo and Mr Prentice would brief the Iraqi
Government
“as
appropriate”.
190.
Having seen
the update, Lt Gen Rollo was reported to have commented: “I
note
the
contrast between these negotiations and the situation elsewhere in
Iraq where US
policy
towards JAM ill-behaviour is one of prompt retribution (while
avoiding outright
conflict).
This may be mitigated by clear evidence that the process is
contributing to
overall
stability in Basra.”
191.
The account of
the meeting produced by government officials on the
ground
working
closely with the military on 13 August reported that it
“figuratively signed and
sealed the
[NAME OF OPERATION] agreement”.85
192.
On 13 August,
MND(SE) released the four detainees nominated by
JAM1.86
84
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Leslie, 10 August 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: update on negotiations with JAM in
Basrah’.
85
Email
official working closely with the military, 13 August 2007, ‘[NAME
OF OPERATION]:
JAM1 - 12
August Meeting’.
86
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Leslie, 10 August 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: update on negotiations with JAM in
Basrah’.
218