3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
808.
The JIC
sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq’s ability and intent
to
conduct
terrorist operations.
809.
At the request
of the FCO, the JIC reviewed current developments in Iraq
from
Saddam
Hussein’s perspective and possible Iraqi moves in the coming
weeks.265
810.
The minutes of
the JIC discussion on 29 January record that the draft
Assessment
had been
difficult to write given the fast‑moving developments and it was
important to
ensure it
reflected the latest information, especially the UNMOVIC
perspective.266
They
also
recorded that:
“… it was
difficult to predict if and when Saddam might launch pre‑emptive
strikes,
but the
paper should try and make a judgement on possible timescales. The
trigger
would
probably be set when Saddam concluded that his fate was sealed,
rather
than any
movements by Coalition Forces. Most of the Iraqi military would
probably
crumble
quickly under attack. Saddam would maintain his hold on of power
until
then, and
there were no indications of possible coups beforehand. Whilst the
Iraqi
public
might welcome the end of Saddam’s regime, they were also concerned
about
the human
costs of fighting.”
811.
The key
elements of the Assessment are set out in the Box
below.
Key
Judgements
•
“Retaining WMD
remains a vital Iraqi interest. Saddam might
nevertheless
consider a
last minute tactical declaration of some of his WMD to avert a
war,
believing
that he can rebuild his WMD capability later.”
•
“Saddam does
not appear to realise the severity of the military attack he
faces.
Senior
Iraqi officials, although increasingly convinced of the
inevitability of a
US‑led
attack, are unlikely to be telling Saddam about their
concerns.”
•
“Saddam has
not lost control or the capacity for rational tactical decisions.
He
continues
to maintain regime cohesion, primarily through intimidation. He
is
unlikely to
agree to relinquish power or to go into exile. He still believes he
has
a chance of
averting military action or, once military action begins, forcing
the
Coalition
to cease hostilities before his regime collapses.”
•
“Once military
action has begun, widespread lack of loyalty to the regime
will
become
clear. Iraqis may not welcome Coalition military forces, but most
will at
least
acquiesce in Coalition military activity to topple the regime, as
long as civilian
casualties
are limited. A hard‑fought professional defence of Baghdad is
unlikely,
although
elite military and security elements closely identified with the
regime may
fight until
their positions become untenable.”
265
JIC
Assessment, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The Emerging View from
Baghdad’.
266
Minutes, 29
January 2003, JIC meeting.
145