9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
81.
In June 2004,
the US and UK ceased to be Occupying Powers in Iraq and the
CPA
was
disbanded. Responsibility for day-to-day interaction on civil
affairs with the Iraqi
Interim
Government passed to the newly appointed British and US
Ambassadors.
82.
After the
handover, the UK’s priorities were to maintain the momentum of
the
political
process towards elections in January 2005, and to ensure that the
conditions
for the
drawdown of its forces were achieved.
83.
Mr Blair
and President Bush continued to discuss Iraq on a regular basis.
It
continued
to be the case that relatively small issues were raised to this
level. The UK
took false
comfort that it was involved in US decision-making from the
strength of that
relationship.
84.
Themes which
Mr Blair emphasised to President Bush included the
acceleration
of Security
Sector Reform and the Iraqiisation of security, UN engagement,
better
outreach to
the Sunni community (often referred to as “reconciliation”),
provision of direct
support to
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and better use of local media to
transmit a positive
message
about the coalition’s intentions and actions.
85.
By July 2004,
the UK envisaged that, providing the necessary criteria were
met,
there would
be a gradual reduction in troop numbers during 2005 leading to
final
withdrawal
in 2006, to be followed by a period of “Strategic
Overwatch”.
86.
The most
important of the criteria that would enable coalition troops to
withdraw was
the ability
of the Iraqi Security Forces to take the lead on security
(Iraqiisation). Having
recognised
that a stable and secure environment was the key factor on which
progress
in Iraq
depended, by May 2004 the UK solution was “a better and quicker
plan for
building
Iraqi capacity in the Police, Civil Defence Corps, the Army and the
Intelligence
Service”.23
This made
sense in the long term but was unlikely to meet the
requirement
to regain
control of Iraq rapidly in the face of a mounting insurgency.
Reform of the Iraqi
Security
Forces is addressed in detail in Section 12.
87.
By mid-August,
the level of attacks against coalition forces had matched
the
previous
peak in April of the same year. In September, Lieutenant General
John McColl
(Senior
British Military Representative – Iraq) judged that the Iraqi
Security Forces would
not be able
to take full responsibility for security before 2006.
88.
In September
2004, Gen Walker received a well-argued piece of advice
from
Lt Gen
McColl which made clear that the conditions on which decisions on
drawdown
23
Letter
Bowen to Baker, 13 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Security’.
485