The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
recruited,
they lived on the ground amongst the militia and they were not
prepared to
fight the
militia, because they knew that, if they did, they would come off
worse.”1175
1265.
On 16 November
at DOP(I), VAdm Style stated that ISF would be in the lead
of
Op SINBAD
pulses from the end of the month and that they would be fully in
charge of
the
operation, including planning, by the end of
February.1176
He
described Op SINBAD
as a
“considerable success” but stated that progress on reforming the
police remained
weak.
1266.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, VAdm Style described some of the
achievements
of Op SINBAD:
“… a new
level of co‑operation between our own forces and the Iraqi Army,
better
Iraqi Army
and police co‑operation … extra equipment was brought in … By
the
end …
the Iraqis were in the lead to an extent they had not been
before.”1177
1267.
On 30
November, Maj Gen Shirreff reported that Op SINBAD
was progressing
well and
considered future plans:
“Op SINBAD
has led to improvements both in the general security situation
(as
evidenced
by the declining murder rate) and the confidence and capability of
the
ISF.
Mentoring of the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre by MND(SE)
has led to
noticeable
improvements in its ability to plan and coordinate operations.
Similarly
the
mentoring and training conducted by the police transition teams
have led to
an
improvement in the average transition readiness assessment … I
assess that
as SINBAD
culminates we will be able to say, quite reasonably, that the
security
framework
we have established in Basra will set the conditions for
PIC.
“With
regards to corrupt IPS, the DIA have already started tackling
corrupt policemen
but they
are a small team and it will take time before they have a
significant effect.
In the
meantime I have had my staff refine our plans to deal with the
Serious Crimes
Unit (SCU),
the largest and most dangerous of the corrupt IPS units, with
support
from
elements of the ISF. My intention is to replace the SCU with a new
unit – the
MCU (Major
Crimes Unit). The first phase will be to secure the new location
(the
Warren) and
to screen those already at the site. The Jameat police station
(the
present
site of the SCU) will be cleared once the Warren is secure and
those
present
will be assessed, the ineffective will be removed/transferred and
the known
criminal
element will be arrested. Finally those selected for the MCU will
be carefully
screened
and those that pass will be closely monitored, mentored and
trained.”1178
1175
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 23‑24.
1176
Minutes, 16
November 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
1177
Public
hearing, 5 January 2010, pages 39‑40.
1178
Minute
Shirreff, 30 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
30 November 2006’.
348