1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
797.
In a message
specifically to the US, Mr Blair warned that “those nations
which
have the
power, have the responsibility” and that the US should “never fall
again for
the doctrine
of isolationism”. He added:
“… in
Britain you have a friend and an ally that will stand with you,
work with you,
fashion
with you the design of a future built on peace and prosperity for
all, which
is the
only dream that makes humanity worth preserving.”
798.
The speech
attracted considerable attention and acclaim, including in the US.
In
his memoir,
Mr Blair described it as “an explicit rejection of the narrow
view of national
interest”.311
The Inquiry
addresses the military intervention in Iraq in relation to
the
principles
set out in the speech and Mr Blair’s message to the US in
Section 3.
799.
Mr Cook
and Mr Robertson circulated a Joint Memorandum on Future
Strategy
towards
Iraq to members of DOP on 17 May 1999.312
It set out
the short, medium
and
long-term objectives for UK policy against a background of
international concern
about the
adverse humanitarian impact of sanctions and a shortfall in
“Oil-for-Food”
revenues
(US$4bn in the previous year) against assessed need (US$10.6bn per
annum
recommended
by Mr Annan). There had been “extensive deterioration of
essential
infrastructure
and social services, a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural
output
and
worsening social indicators”. The Joint Memorandum identified the
Government’s
policy
objectives towards Iraq since 1991 as:
“… in the
short term, to reduce the threat Saddam poses to the region,
including
by
eliminating his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programmes; and,
in the
longer
term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law-abiding
member of the
international
community.”
800.
The Joint
Memorandum recorded that the UK had sought to achieve those
aims
“by a
policy of containment, through active support of UNSCOM/IAEA
efforts to complete
WMD
disarmament in Iraq, diplomatic pressure and sanctions, backed by
the threat and,
as
necessary, use of military force”. That had been the US approach
“although they flirt
with a
harder line”.
801.
On the success
of that policy and its longer-term prospects, the Joint
Memorandum
stated:
“Containment
has kept the lid on Saddam … But containment has
disadvantages:
it does not
produce rapid or decisive results; it is resource-intensive,
requiring
constant
diplomatic effort and a significant military presence; and it is
not always
311
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
312
Joint
Memorandum Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
and the Secretary of
State for
Defence, 17 May 1999, ‘Iraq: Future Strategy’.
175