Executive
Summary
733.
After becoming
Defence Secretary in May 2005, Dr Reid had continued the
policy
of reducing
UK troop levels based on the transition of lead responsibility for
security
to the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In one of his early acts as Defence
Secretary, he
announced
the deployment of just over 400 additional personnel to enhance the
UK’s
effort in
training the ISF, which would “enable them to take on ever greater
responsibility
for their
own security and so pave the way for UK troops to
withdraw”.255
734.
The proposals
for transfer of the four provinces in MND(SE) to Iraqi control
agreed
in July
2005 suggested transition from MNF‑I to ISF primacy in Basra from
March 2006,
based on
the assumption that the ISF would, by that point, be capable of
taking on
responsibility
for security in what was likely to remain a very challenging
environment.
735.
There was
sufficient reliable contemporary evidence available, including from
the
JIC and in
reports from commanders in theatre, to demonstrate that the
assumption that
the ISF
would be ready to take the lead in Basra by that point was probably
unrealistic.
736.
In September
2005, Mr Blair expressed his concerns about ISF
capability,
following
reports of police involvement in attacks on the MNF in Basra. But
despite
concerns
that had been expressed about the capacity of the ISF, Dr Reid
recommended
that a
reduction in UK forces should take place in October or November
2005.
737.
A few days
after Dr Reid made his recommendation, the Jameat incident in
Basra
(see
Section 12.1) raised questions about the ISF in MND(SE). Officials
from the FCO,
the MOD and
DFID judged that the incident had highlighted the risks to
achieving UK
objectives
in MND(SE), and that those risks had implications for military
resources.
Nevertheless,
assumptions about ISF readiness were not re‑examined by
Ministers.
The
incident should have prompted a more searching analysis of whether
the conditions
necessary
for drawdown were likely to be met within the planned timetable.
Reluctance
to consider
the potential implications of the Jameat incident obscured what it
had
revealed
about the security situation in MND(SE).
738.
The critical
importance of ISF capability in assessing readiness for transfer
to
Provincial
Iraqi Control, on which UK plans to draw down were based, was
emphasised
by the
‘Conditions for Provincial Transfer’ published by the Joint
Iraqi/MNF Committee
to Transfer
Security Responsibility, and by Dr Reid, who told DOP(I) that
“successful
Iraqiisation
remains the key”.256
DOP(I)
decided that Dr Reid should have lead
responsibility
for building the capacity of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in
Basra in
addition to
his responsibility for the Iraqi Army.
739.
In October
2005, Mr Blair asked for a major and sustained push to make
progress
on the
ability of the ISF to take the lead on security. Gen Jackson
raised concerns about
ISF
effectiveness in a minute to Gen Walker, and concluded: “it is
not to our credit that
255
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25 May
2005, column 15WS.
256
Paper Reid,
11 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Security Update’.
101