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Executive Summary
IRAQIISATION
733.  After becoming Defence Secretary in May 2005, Dr Reid had continued the policy
of reducing UK troop levels based on the transition of lead responsibility for security
to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In one of his early acts as Defence Secretary, he
announced the deployment of just over 400 additional personnel to enhance the UK’s
effort in training the ISF, which would “enable them to take on ever greater responsibility
for their own security and so pave the way for UK troops to withdraw”.255
734.  The proposals for transfer of the four provinces in MND(SE) to Iraqi control agreed
in July 2005 suggested transition from MNF‑I to ISF primacy in Basra from March 2006,
based on the assumption that the ISF would, by that point, be capable of taking on
responsibility for security in what was likely to remain a very challenging environment.
735.  There was sufficient reliable contemporary evidence available, including from the
JIC and in reports from commanders in theatre, to demonstrate that the assumption that
the ISF would be ready to take the lead in Basra by that point was probably unrealistic.
736.  In September 2005, Mr Blair expressed his concerns about ISF capability,
following reports of police involvement in attacks on the MNF in Basra. But despite
concerns that had been expressed about the capacity of the ISF, Dr Reid recommended
that a reduction in UK forces should take place in October or November 2005.
737.  A few days after Dr Reid made his recommendation, the Jameat incident in Basra
(see Section 12.1) raised questions about the ISF in MND(SE). Officials from the FCO,
the MOD and DFID judged that the incident had highlighted the risks to achieving UK
objectives in MND(SE), and that those risks had implications for military resources.
Nevertheless, assumptions about ISF readiness were not re‑examined by Ministers.
The incident should have prompted a more searching analysis of whether the conditions
necessary for drawdown were likely to be met within the planned timetable. Reluctance
to consider the potential implications of the Jameat incident obscured what it had
revealed about the security situation in MND(SE).
738.  The critical importance of ISF capability in assessing readiness for transfer to
Provincial Iraqi Control, on which UK plans to draw down were based, was emphasised
by the ‘Conditions for Provincial Transfer’ published by the Joint Iraqi/MNF Committee
to Transfer Security Responsibility, and by Dr Reid, who told DOP(I) that “successful
Iraqiisation remains the key”.256 DOP(I) decided that Dr Reid should have lead
responsibility for building the capacity of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in Basra in
addition to his responsibility for the Iraqi Army.
739.  In October 2005, Mr Blair asked for a major and sustained push to make progress
on the ability of the ISF to take the lead on security. Gen Jackson raised concerns about
ISF effectiveness in a minute to Gen Walker, and concluded: “it is not to our credit that
255 House of Commons, Official Report, 25 May 2005, column 15WS.
256 Paper Reid, 11 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Security Update’.
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