3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
mid- to
late March. The military will be fully in place, and, the White
House believes,
political
support, both domestically and within the region, will wane, the
longer Bush
is seen to
prevaricate.”
234.
Sir
Christopher commented that the US Administration considered that
Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei’s
visit to Baghdad had achieved “next to nothing”. It
knew:
“… full
well that some in the UNSC will seize on the faintest glimmer of
hope of Iraqi
co-operation
as a reason to delay decisions. The US bottom line remains full
Iraqi
co-operation
…”
235.
Sir
Christopher also commented:
“Although
militarily capable of doing so, the US does not want to go it
alone. On the
Sunday talk
shows, Powell and Rice highlighted the support of eighteen
European
allies and
of Turkey and Jordan …”
236.
Referring to
the “shenanigans in NATO over precautionary planning for the
defence
of Turkey”,
Sir Christopher added:
“These
tussles with the international system will only deepen US
scepticism about
a role
for the UN in managing the aftermath in Iraq.”
237.
Mr Blair
suggested to President Bush on 11 February that a
second
resolution
might include a decision that Iraq was in material breach, an
ultimatum
that Saddam
should leave, and a timeline.
238.
When he
telephoned President Bush on 11 February, Mr Blair discussed
opinions
in the UK
and international community, including the reports of a
Franco-German “plan”
which had
appeared in Der
Spiegel and the
forthcoming European Council.64
239.
Mr Blair
suggested that a second resolution might include three main
points:
•
a decision
that Iraq was in material breach of UNSCR 1441;
•
an
ultimatum that Saddam should leave; and
•
a
timeline.
Even if the
ultimatum failed, it would show that the UK had been prepared to
resolve
the issue
peacefully right to the end.
240.
Mr Blair
and President Bush also discussed the need for US action if a
second
resolution
was to be achieved.
64
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush,
11 February’.
223