12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

• “We are confident that this mix of activity will get the Basra police to the required

standard for transition, even if problems will remain. But we intend to retain a

significant police training, support and mentoring presence to sustain forward

momentum after transition, including at the PJCC in Basra city.”

1305.  On 10 January, the MOD produced an update on UK military plans for transition

for DOP(I).1205 An annex provided an interim assessment of Op SINBAD. It stated that

a clearer review would be available in March but that there were a number of positive

outcomes as well as some areas requiring more work.

1306.  The annex noted that police effectiveness had increased; it was currently

assessed as 69 percent capable and was on track for the 72 percent capability required

for transition. But parts of the IPS remained “actively criminal” and harboured the “Death

Squads responsible for a large proportion of the murder rate in Basra”.

1307.  The Iraqi Army had taken the lead through the latter stages of Op SINBAD and

was able to respond to requests for assistance through MND(SE). It still lacked the

“capability, structurally and conceptually” to deploy nationwide.

1308.  Op SINBAD had also “confirmed suspicions that some leaders in parts of the

Iraqi security sector in MND(SE) are not fit for task, including members of the Iraqi

Army and the Basra Security Committee”.

1309.  DOP(I) considered the paper on 11 January.1206

1310.  The minutes recorded that, although arrest warrants had been issued for

members of the SCU, they had not been actioned and there were signs that those

members were “continuing to operate”. The UK would continue to press Mr Boulani,

and the mentoring effort in the MOI should be increased.

1311.  Cabinet discussed Op SINBAD and transition in Basra later that day.1207 Mr Blair

stated that during his visit at the end of 2006 “he had sensed, for the first time, that Iraqi

generals felt that if they were given the right training and equipment they would be able

to do the job”.

1312.  Mr Browne said that ISF “would only improve if they were given more

responsibility”. He reiterated the problems with the police, particularly the SCU, and

stated that the UK was “determined” that rogue officers “would not be allowed to remain

in the police”.

1313.  On 17 January, the JIC assessed:

“In MND(SE) the predominantly Shia 10th Division is already operating

independently in the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar and much of Maysan …

1205  Paper MOD, 10 January 2007, ‘UK Military Transition Plans for Southern Iraq’.

1206  Minutes, 11 January 2007, DOP(I) meeting.

1207  Cabinet Conclusions, 11 January 2007.

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