The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
586.
On 20 October,
Lt Gen McColl sent the Hauldown Report of his tour in
Iraq.533
He wrote:
“Despite
their limited numbers and state of training, ISF are even now
capable of
strategically
significant impact. Their deployment has an effect that coalition
troops
cannot
achieve … They are therefore in great demand and, there is a risk …
that
their
premature committal to operations, which are still beyond their
capacity, could
irreparably
dent their confidence. The risk is exacerbated by the
understandable
impatience
of the IIG, supported to some extent in both Washington and London
…
“The
critical path for the IPS will be meeting the sheer scale of the
equipping and
training
requirement, as well as the continued identification of tough
committed
police
chiefs. There are grounds for optimism, but no police force could
operate in
the current
levels of violence without relying on the support of the Army,
including the
ING, to
provide a secure framework and surge capability …
“The
frustration that the UK has felt at the slow and chequered progress
of ISF
generation
has been understandable. Our contribution outside MND(SE)
has,
however
been limited (aside from helpful training team activity) to advice
to US
colleagues
who are themselves frustrated and doing all they can to translate
the
$5 billion
they are investing into security capability, whilst reconciling the
somewhat
turbulent
aspirations of the IIG. Within MND(SE) the flow of equipment to ING
and
IPS from US
suppliers has been painfully slow, a problem compounded by
the
prioritisation
of issue based on the prevailing security situation across the
country.
There has
recently been an initiative, which has yet to deliver effect that
would allow
UK
resources to support the equipping of the ISF within the UK area;
this is to be
welcomed
and is perhaps overdue.”
587.
On putting the
right structures in place, Lt Gen McColl referenced the need
to put
particular
emphasis on developing the MOI “staff planning capability”, which
remained
“the most
serious concern”.
588.
On 27 October,
a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment reported
that
the
capability of the ISF was “growing” but that their effectiveness
remained “patchy”.534
It stated:
“The more
reliable and better trained elements are in short supply and limit
the
current
ability of the IIG to conduct more than one or two concurrent
operations.
The ISF
will improve slowly up to the elections and their capability is
planned to
build
significantly in the early part of 2005. But we judge that they
will not be able
to handle
significant security responsibilities unaided until the middle of
2005 at the
earliest.
The nascent Iraqi intelligence service (INIS) is also under severe
pressure
and
continues to suffer from assassinations and
penetration.”
533
Report
McColl to CDS and CJO, 20 October 2004, ‘SBMR‑I Hauldown report –
Lt Gen McColl’.
534
JIC
Assessment, 27 October 2004, ‘Iraq: A Long‑Term Insurgency
Problem’.
184