The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
290.
On 9
September, it was confirmed that Mr Scarlett and the
Assessments Staff
would be
responsible for the production of the Iraq dossier.
291.
After a
discussion with Mr Scarlett, Mr Campbell wrote setting
out the process
by which
the dossier would be produced:
“The first
point is that this must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and
your
team, and
that its credibility depends fundamentally on that.
“The second
is that you are working on a new dossier, according to the
structure
we agreed
at the meeting last week, to meet the new circumstances which
have
developed
over recent weeks and months. Therefore, the rush of comments on
the
old dossier
are not necessary or totally relevant. People should wait for the
new one
which will
be more detailed and substantial.”145
292.
Mr Campbell
wrote that the structure agreed the previous week was
“roughly”:
“•
why the
issue arose in the first place
•
why the
inspection process was necessary
•
the history
of concealment and deception
•
the story
of inspectors, leading to their departure
•
the story
of weapons unaccounted for, and what they could do
•
a section
on ballistic missile technology
•
CW/BW
•
nuclear
•
the
sanctions regime, and how the policy of containment has worked
only
up to a
point
•
illicit
money
•
the
repressive nature of the regime
•
why the
history … makes us worried he cannot be allowed further to
develop
these
weapons.”
293.
Much of the
content of the dossier would be “obviously historical”, and that
was
“a vital
part of the overall story”. Mr Campbell added:
“The
media/political judgement will inevitably focus on ‘what’s new?’
and I was
pleased to
hear from you and your SIS colleagues that, contrary to media
reports
today, the
intelligence community are taking such a helpful approach to this
in
going
through all the material they have. It goes without saying that
there should
be nothing
published that you and they are not 100 percent happy
with.”
145
Minute
Campbell to Scarlett, 9 September 2002, [untitled].
170