The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
71.
On 1 April,
the IPU advised Mr Straw on the UK’s future engagement with
ORHA.45
The IPU
assessed that, while ORHA was “in many ways a sub‑optimal
organisation
for
delivering the UK’s Phase IV46
objectives”,
it was “the only game in town”. There
was,
however, “ample scope” to use UK secondees to exert leverage over
US Phase
IV planning
and implementation. The IPU recommended that the UK should
continue
to commit
resources to ORHA where the UK “could add real value and exert
influence
over emerging
US perspectives and plans”.
72.
The IPU also
recommended that the UK should:
•
continue to
make clear to the US the limits within which the UK, including
UK
personnel
within ORHA, could operate;
•
seek close
consultation on ORHA’s plans, to ensure that they did not cross
UK
“red
lines”; and
•
subject to
those points, confirm Maj Gen Cross as Deputy to Lt
Gen Garner.
73.
The IPU
reported that ORHA, which at that stage was in Kuwait, had
approximately
200 staff,
expected to rise to over 1,000 by the time it deployed to Iraq. The
UK and
Australia
each had six officers seconded to ORHA. Five more UK secondees
were
“in the
pipeline” and one was working in ORHA’s back office in the
Pentagon. The UK
secondees
were “fully integrated” and “adding significant value”. At ORHA’s
request, the
IPU was
considering whether to strengthen UK representation, particularly
in the areas
of public
relations, civil administration and humanitarian
operations.
74.
On 2 April,
Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO Political Director, sent Sir David
Manning an
earlier
version of the IPU paper, which identified areas in which the UK
was considering
strengthening
its representation: public relations, civil administration,
humanitarian
advice and
administrative support for existing secondees.47
75.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Washington,
warned
Sir David
Manning on 3 April that the UK was “in danger of being left behind”
on
ORHA.48
The list of
senior officials to “shadow” ministries in Iraq was almost
complete
and those
officials would start deploying soon. Australia had bid for a
place. The UK had
not, even
though the US had said it would be open to such a bid.
Mr Brenton advised
that:
“Following
our significant military efforts we surely have an interest in
following
through to
the civilian phase. If so, given the advanced state of US
preparations,
it will be
important that we vigorously pursue the point at next week’s talks
[at
Hillsborough].”
45
Minute Iraq
Planning Unit to Private Secretary [FCO], 1 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
ORHA’ attaching Paper IPU,
28 March
2003, ‘Iraq: Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA)’.
46
The
military term for the post‑conflict phase of operations in
Iraq.
47
Letter
Ricketts to Manning, 2 April 2003, ‘ORHA’ attaching Paper Iraq
Planning Unit, 27 March 2003,
‘Iraq:
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA)’.
48
Letter
Brenton to Manning, 3 April 2003, ‘Post Conflict
Iraq’.
256