The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
686.
Dr Rice
told Sir David that the objections raised by France in
relation:
“… to the
language dealing with: ‘material breach’; ‘serious consequences’;
and
OP5 … were
unacceptable to Washington. The US had gone a long way in
meeting
French and
Russian difficulties. The earlier reference to ‘all necessary
means’ had
been
dropped … there was agreement to go back to the Council to assess
any
Blix report
of violations; and it was clear to everyone that a second
resolution could
be tabled
by the French whatever the US and UK might prefer. The
Administration
could not
give any more ground … on the substance. There had been lots
of
publicity
about US concessions already. Today there were two editorials in
major US
newspapers
… saying it was time for Washington to put down its draft
resolution …
either the
UN backed the resolution; or the US went to war.”
687.
Sir David told
Dr Rice that he “understood the political pressures” but the
effect
of tabling
a resolution “on a take‑it or leave‑it basis would not necessarily
be clear
cut”.
France and Russia might table a resolution which might attract more
support.
In response
to a comment from Dr Rice that the US and UK “would have to
veto the
counter‑draft
just as the French and Russians would no doubt veto ours”, Sir
David
replied
that was possible, “but deeply unattractive”. That was why the UK
had proposed
discussion
at Foreign Minister level.
688.
Dr Rice
told Sir David that the:
“Essential
elements for the US were:
•
Maintaining
the references to ‘material breach’ and ‘serious
consequences’
•
Retaining
the wording ‘… false statements or omissions … and failure
by
Iraq at any
time to comply …’
•
Standing
firm on the terms of the inspections regime
•
No further
weakening of OP12.”
689.
Sir David
stated that the UK’s willingness to co‑sponsor the
resolution
demonstrated
that it was “in firm agreement on the elements” of the resolution,
but he
“accepted
that there might be differences on where to compromise if there was
a serious
negotiation”.
That would be a matter “for the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Secretary”
whom he
would consult. Dr Rice also said she would try to set up a
conference call
between
herself, Sir David, Secretary Powell and
Mr Straw.
690.
Dr Rice
concluded that France still seemed to misunderstand the US
position, and
its
apparent belief that the US would, if pushed, concede was
“mistaken”. “Washington
was ready
to go it alone if it had to; and the consequence would be that the
UN would
be marginalised
for a long time to come.”
691.
Sir David
suggested that he was not sure President Chirac understood.
It “seemed
to him”
that President Chirac’s “grasp of the issue” was “uncertain, and
sometimes
emotional”.
Dr Rice should talk to the Élysée.
322