3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
848.
The MOD “line
to take” suggested for Mr Blair was that, if military
operations were
to be
delayed beyond April/May, the UK would “struggle to put together
this scale of
force again
for the autumn, especially if the fire strike continues. So
militarily we could
bear some
delay but not too much.”
849.
The background
briefing for Mr Blair advised that, if operations were not
initiated
in the
spring, the UK would “face some awkward choices”. Some “key
elements of
the UK
contribution were unique” – including the Commando Brigade, the Air
Assault
Brigade and
a specialist helicopter carrier ship. The MOD
suggested:
“If
operations were not going to start until the autumn, we would need
to consider
bringing
some forces back to the UK in the meantime. Our ability to provide
a
major
contribution later in the year will also be severely constrained if
the fire strike
continues
beyond the spring.”
850.
The MOD also
advised Mr Blair that agreement on the objectives for a
military
campaign
would be needed. The development of the UK’s objectives and the
discussion
of the
legal basis for the conduct of military operations are addressed in
Section 6.2.
851.
In relation to
targeting, the “line to take” offered to Mr Blair was that the
UK was
“working up
our strategic objectives for a military campaign. We need to relate
this
to the
legal base we establish.” It was “Very important that UK and US
objectives are
aligned
soon and in advance of commitment to action so that we can come to
a clear
and common
understanding on targeting
issues and
the information
campaign.”
That would
need “careful handling domestically”.
852.
The background
briefing for Mr Blair explained that the current thinking
was that
the
objectives would be published “close to, or at the start of
hostilities”. The MOD
explained
that the military objectives would enable it to “satisfy” itself
“that they
represent[ed]
minimum use of force as required by international law”, and to use
the
CDS
Directive to indicate “what military missions are legitimate,
including … what
targets we
can legitimately attack from the air; and plan information
operations”.
853.
A “publicly
agreed set of aligned military objectives”, being prepared by
the
Cabinet
Office, would enable the UK to participate in a “joined up
information
operations
campaign”.
854.
The FCO
focused on the need for more time in the hope of
disarming
Iraq
without military action and, if that was not possible, support for
a second
resolution.
155