The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
9.
In reply
Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, explained:
“It is a
very difficult question to answer at this stage, not least because
the only way
of assuring
success in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was to be a member of the
Ba’ath
party and
to operate under his rule. On the other hand, there may well be
decent
people who
had no part in the excesses of the regime and who will, in turn,
return
to rebuild
their country. I suspect that it will depend on their ability to
persuade
people in
their own areas that they have not been involved with the regime
and that
they can
therefore be relied on and trusted.”
10.
Mr Hoon’s
reply was consistent with a briefing produced on the same date by
the
Defence
Intelligence Service (DIS) Red Team on Iraq.5
The Red
Team judged:
“To be a
Ba’athist does not necessarily mean an individual is a hard core
supporter
of the
regime. Most joined to advance their careers or under duress
(mostly
government
employees). In every government department there is a hard core
who
have been
responsible for security. They are responsible for the
‘disappeared’; are
known by
everybody and will be nervous.
“It will
require detailed inside knowledge to identify the ‘bad apples’ in
any
organisation
…”
11.
Similar points
were made by Ms Clare Short, the International
Development
Secretary,
on 10 April.6
In response
to a Parliamentary Question from Ms Helen
Southworth,
Ms Short said:
“… Iraq is
like the former Soviet Union, where people had to join the
Communist
party if
they wanted to be a teacher. Many members of the Ba’ath Party are
not
the real
leaders of the regime, and they will need to remain in their jobs
so as to
continue to
run their country.”
12.
The first
formal public statement by the Coalition about the treatment of the
Ba’ath
Party was
made when General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief US
Central
Command
(CENTCOM), issued his Freedom Message to the Iraqi People on 16
April
(see
Section 9.1).
13.
As described
in Section 9.1, Mr Huw Llewellyn from FCO Legal Advisers
provided
advice to
the Iraq Policy Unit (IPU) on the draft text of the Message on 28
March.7
14.
In relation to
de‑Ba’athification, Mr Llewellyn was concerned that the
practical
effect of
disestablishing the Ba’ath Party was not implemented in the
Directive to the
Civilian
Population that Gen Franks intended to issue in parallel. He
also suggested
5
Briefing
DIS Red Team, 7 April 2003, ‘What Will Happen in
Baghdad?’
6
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 10 April
2003, column 444.
7
Minute
Llewellyn to Chilcott, 28 March 2003, ‘Proposed US “Freedom
Message” to the People of Iraq’.
4