The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
265.
Reflecting the
JIC Assessment of 27 February, that Iraq continued to pursue
the
development
of weapons of mass destruction, the Cabinet Office paper stated
that
Iraq
continued “to develop WMD, although our intelligence is poor”.
There was no
greater
threat now that Saddam would use WMD than there had been in recent
years.
Current
intelligence was “insufficiently robust” to convince the P5 and the
majority of the
Security
Council that Iraq was in breach of its obligations; the proof would
need to be
“incontrovertible
and of large-scale activity to meet that criterion”.
266.
The JIC
Assessments of Iraq’s ability and intent to pursue weapons of
mass
destruction
programmes, and the robustness of their judgements, is addressed
in
Section
4.1.
267.
An improved
containment policy would make a sanctions regime more
attractive
and reduce Iraq’s illicit revenues. The return of the inspectors
would
also allow
greater scrutiny of Iraq’s WMD programme and security
forces.
268.
The US had,
however, lost confidence in the policy.
269.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that a policy to toughen containment
would
comprise:
•
full
implementation of all relevant Security Council
resolutions;
•
introduction
of the revised sanctions regime and a Goods Review List in
May
as envisaged
in resolution 1382 (2001);
•
clarification
of the modalities of resolution 1284 (1999) with a specific
demand
that Iraq
re-admit UN inspectors with the aim of telling Saddam Hussein to
admit
inspectors
or face the risk of military action;
•
pushing for
tougher action, especially by the US, against states
breaking
sanctions;
•
maintaining
the present military posture, including in the No-Fly Zones,
and
being
prepared robustly to respond to any Iraqi adventurism;
and
•
continuing
to make clear “without overtly espousing regime change” the
view
that Iraq
would be better off without Saddam Hussein.
270.
Toughening
containment would put pressure on Saddam Hussein. The
Goods
Review List
would make the sanctions regime more attractive. Better
implementation
of
sanctions would reduce Iraq’s illicit revenues. The return of
inspectors would allow
greater
scrutiny of Iraq’s WMD programme and security forces.
271.
Some of the
difficulties with the existing policy would, however, still apply.
They
included:
•
Tougher
containment would not reintegrate Iraq into the international
community
as it
offered little prospect of removing Saddam Hussein.
434