4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
document
could be published. Mr Straw was also thinking of making a
statement to
Parliament.
367.
Mr Campbell
asked: “Do you and copy recipients agree with this
approach?
Is it doable?”
368.
The JIC was
informed on 20 March that an unclassified paper on Iraq’s weapons
of
mass
destruction was “due to be made public on 25 March, following
detailed discussion
with
interested parties”.162
369.
The minutes of
the JIC meeting record that:
“In a short
discussion, the main point made was that the production of this
document
followed in
the wake of similar exercises during the Kosovo conflict and
after
the events
of 11 September. On each occasion there had been a need to
use
secret
intelligence for public consumption, in this current case because
of policy
imperatives,
but each case needed to be taken on its merits. In some
circumstances
it would be
difficult to meet the political need for material to use in
public.”
370.
Concern was
expressed about the potential to undermine the
Government’s
policy of
not commenting on intelligence matters, which might merit further
discussion
“at some stage”.
371.
Sir David
Manning sought Mr Blair’s views on the publication of the
document,
which gave
details of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programmes “drawn from
intelligence,
providing
as much detail as we can safely reveal”, on 20
March.163
Mr Campbell,
Mr Powell,
Mr Scarlett and he had discussed the handling of the paper and
concluded
that it
should be issued “soon”. A speech or statement by Mr Straw on
25 March, which
described
“a regime which terrorises its own people and is determined to
acquire WMD
to
terrorise its neighbours … would be the cue for placing” the paper
“in the Library of
the House,
and for subsequent briefing of the media”.
372.
Sir David
concluded:
“We
discussed whether we should delay until after you have been to
Crawford.
On balance
we concluded it would serve our purpose better to release
the
material now
to avoid charges that this was an exercise that we had
undertaken
at Bush’s
prompting.
“Are you
content for us to go ahead on this basis?”
373.
In a
manuscript postscript, Sir David added that the proposal had been
discussed
with
Mr Straw, who was happy but preferred a speech in the House to
a statement.
162
Minutes, 20
March 2002, JIC meeting.
163
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 20 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
81