9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
•
It is
likely that debate in Washington about the results of the
‘surge’
[see Section 9.5]
will result in an announcement this autumn that US
troop
draw down
will begin either late in 2007, or in early 2008;
•
The best
way forward for us remains sticking to the transition strategy we
have
consistently
followed, and handing over the fourth and last province in
our
sector,
Basra, to Iraqi security control this autumn;
•
The final
decision on when Basra should be transferred to lead Iraqi
security
control
lies in Iraqi and US hands. The actual handover will take place at
the
earliest in
September;
•
Thereafter,
our engagement in Southern Iraq will move into a distinct new
phase.
Our effort
is already reaping diminishing returns. This trend will accelerate
once
we move
into ‘Overwatch’ mode in Basra. The threats we face will remain.
Our
ability to
deliver military and civilian effect will be limited both by the
security
environment
and Iraqi appetite for UK support. We therefore believe that
we
should see
the period of ‘Overwatch’ lasting for a matter of months, not
longer;
•
Sustaining
our presence at Basra Palace and the Provincial Joint
Co-ordination
Centre is
already putting our forces at very high risk. The strong
military
recommendation
is that we do not remain at these sites for any longer than
is
necessary.
But before we leave Basra Palace, a robust Iraqi security force
must
be in place
to prevent looting;
•
When we
leave Basra Palace, we will need to leave the Provincial
Joint
Co‑ordination
Centre too (meaning no UK presence in the city).”41
83.
The paper
provided an assessment of progress against the UK’s objectives in
Iraq:
“Four years
on … we have achieved only some of our objectives. Iraq has the
forms
of
democracy: a new Constitution … a freely elected Parliament … a
Government
of National
Unity … On paper, Iraq has the machinery of Government in place,
and
security
forces over 350,000 strong (Police 160,000, Army
157,000).
“But behind
these outward signs of progress lie deep-seated problems.
The
constituent
parts of the Iraqi Government are not working together in pursuit
of a
genuine
national unity agenda. Lip service is paid to the need for
reconciliation
between
Iraq’s main communities, notably between Shia and Sunni Arabs
…
“There has
been little progress on the major political issues that have
divided Iraqis
since 2003:
the Constitution (in particular the degree to which Iraq should be
a
federal
state); the management of the oil & gas sector and how its
proceeds should
be
distributed; the extent to which former members of the Ba’ath Party
should be
excluded
from public life.
41
Paper FCO
and MOD, 12 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Transition in Basra’.
199