4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
In a few
significant instances, the analysis in the NIE suffered from a
“layering”
effect,
with assessments built on previous judgements without carrying
forward
the
uncertainties of the underlying judgements.
823.
Between
September 2006 and June 2008, the Senate Intelligence
Committee
published
additional detail on many of the issues addressed in the July 2004
Report.460
The five
parts of its “Phase II” Report covered the expanded investigation
into
pre‑conflict
intelligence announced by the Committee in February
2004:
•
‘The Use by
the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the
Iraqi
National
Congress’ (September 2006);
•
‘Postwar
Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and
How
They
Compare With Prewar Assessments’ (September 2006);
•
‘Prewar
Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq’ (May
2007);
•
‘Report on
Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by US
Government
Officials
Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information’ (June
2008);
•
‘Report on
Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the
Policy
Counterterrorism
Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans Within
the
Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’ (June
2008).
On
13 July, at the request of the Cabinet Office, the CIG
produced an Assessment
reviewing
the links between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein’s
regime.461
The Key
Judgements were:
“•
Nothing we
have learnt since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has
invalidated
previous
JIC judgements on the possible links between the regime and Al
Qaida.
•
There were
some contacts between the regime and Al Qaida during the
1990s,
but they
did not progress beyond the exploratory stage and the degree of
practical
co‑operation,
if any, was limited.
•
Some sources …
asserted that Al Qaida was seeking chemical and biological
(CB)
expertise.
But the intelligence is not strong. Al Qaida did not receive CB
material
from Iraq.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s regime was not involved with the 9/11
attacks.
•
Al Qaida
associates such as [Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi and members of Ansar
al-Islam
were known
by the regime to be operating in Iraq and the Kurdish Autonomous
Zone
(KAZ)
before Coalition action in 2003, but the exact relationship between
the regime
and Al
Qaida-linked terrorists remains unclear.
460
US Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 June 2008,
Senate
Intelligence Committee Unveils
Final Phase II
Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence.
461
CIG
Assessment, 13 July 2004, ‘A Review of Intelligence on
Possible Links Between Al Qaida and
Saddam’s
Regime’.
585