The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
167.
Looking to the
future, the JIC judged that Saddam Hussein was “not yet
convinced”
that a
US:
“… move to
overthrow him is inevitable. While the Coalition campaign continues
in
Afghanistan,
he probably believes the US is militarily preoccupied; in any
event, US
rhetoric
has not so far been backed up by overt preparations to attack. He
still hopes
that his
efforts to counter progress at the UN will undermine support for
sanctions
and for US
military action …”
168.
The Kurds and
Shia “would not show their hand until US resolve to
overthrow
Saddam” was
“absolutely clear”. There was “no obvious leader” among those
groups
who was
“capable of unifying the opposition” and had “credibility and
popular appeal
inside
Iraq”. No likely replacement for Saddam from within the regime had
been
identified,
but the JIC stated that, in the event of internal change, it was
“likely that any
successor
would be autocratic and drawn from the Sunni military
elite”.
“In the
event of a US attack, Saddam would probably shift to a well-tested
defensive
strategy in
the hope that Iraqi resistance to a US ground campaign would
strain
US resolve
… Alternatively, if Saddam believed he was unable to deter a US
attack
to oust his
regime, we judge he would go down fighting and could adopt high
risk
options,
such as seizing northern Iraq, to disrupt US planning. Faced with
defeat,
Saddam
could resort to even riskier options such as conducting terrorist
attacks
or using
weapons of mass destruction against US forces or
Israel.
“Iraq could
fracture under attack. But all Iraq’s neighbours agree that … is
deeply
undesirable.
Each will try to influence events as they develop; it is likely
that Iran …
would try
to maintain and build its influence … But we judge it would try to
avoid
becoming
directly involved in fighting on either side.”
170.
The MOD
advised Mr Hoon that the UK should not rule out military
action
against
Iraq; but there was a need to think through the options in more
depth.
That would
also improve the “prospects of influencing the US towards
a
successful
outcome”.
171.
Mr Simon Webb,
the MOD Policy Director, sent Mr Geoff Hoon, the
Defence
Secretary,
advice on 27 February on how the UK might approach the three
countries
referred to
by President Bush as an “axis of evil”.54
54
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of
Evil’.
416