9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

96. In his weekly update on 13 July, Maj Gen Shaw reported that:

“Gen PETRAEUS considers himself to be the approval authority for PIC in Basra,

he will personally make the decision when the conditions are right, and currently he

does not consider that we are even close.”42

97. Gen Petraeus was reported to be nervous about the readiness of the ISF to assume

full security responsibilities. As a consequence:

“Given that the ISF are unlikely on their own to be sufficient to deliver security

in Basra, the onus will be on the GoI to develop its confidence in its full suite

of governmental/Shia levers and then to over-ride US advice and seize PIC as

is their right.”

98. Maj Gen Shaw felt that the Iraqi Government would need “encouragement” to do

so as “no shift in US attitude is expected before September, and one is not certain

even then”.

99. Maj Gen Shaw took the opportunity to discuss prospects for PIC in Basra with

Lt Gen Odierno and Gen Petraeus during the Corps Conference on 14 July.43 He

reported that Lt Gen Odierno had been “upbeat” and saw the South as “an area in which

risk should be taken”. On PIC, Lt Gen Odierno considered that it would be important

to give the new structures time to bed in before transferring security to them, to give

the Iraqis the best chance of success. Gen Petraeus was clearly focused on how his

September “Honest Assessment” to Congress would be received and relayed US

political concerns about possible UK announcements on troop numbers beforehand.

Maj Gen Shaw commented:

“What came across strongly from both Gen Petraeus and Lt Gen Odierno was an

acceptance of our respective force level and political constraints; but no acceptance

yet of the limitations of the utility of MNF, and the differences in the utility of our

respective forces, derived from the difference in the challenges we face. There is

still no agreed coalition prognosis of the future … Persuading MNC-I and MNF-I that

our projected force plans are justified by the conditions on the ground represents a

major challenge … it remains a hard sell.”

100. Maj Gen Shaw reported that Gen Mohan presented his initial report on the

security situation in Basra to the Iraqi Ministerial Committee on National Security

(MCNS). He painted a bleak picture: insufficient manning and equipment in the Iraqi

Army, a corrupt police force, 24 heavily armed militias backed by Iran and organised

Mafia‑style criminality.

101. Maj Gen Shaw reported that Gen Mohan had “stated categorically … that the

security situation in Basra would be greatly improved by a British redeployment out

42 Minute Shaw to CJO, 13 July 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 13 July 2007’.

43 Minute Shaw to CJO, 19 July 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 19 July 2007’.

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