6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
160.
The PJHQ
record provided the fullest account of the discussion of
post-conflict
issues.
Issues raised by Mr Blair included:
“Worst
Case. The PM wanted to know what CDS thought was the worst
case
scenario.
After much discussion about destroying the oil infrastructure, use
of WMD
and
hunkering down in Baghdad and fighting it out, it was felt that the
worst case
was
internecine fighting between Sunni and Shia, as well as the
Kurds/Turks/Iraqis.
“Aftermath.
This led on to a general discussion on aftermath, with the PM
asking
what the
Iraqi view on it was. CDS stated that the thinking on this issue
was
‘woolly’ at
this stage, with work only just beginning. The PM stated that the
‘Issue’
was
aftermath – the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine
fighting
161.
Mr Blair asked
the MOD to look at three things:
“•
We need to
be clear on what we are offering the Iraqi people and
senior
members of
the regime (those below the top 100 on the list50) –
removal of the
senior
hierarchy or minimising resistance or what?
•
Aftermath.
We have to develop a feasible plan.
•
Look at the
unexpected – think through the big ‘what ifs’; oil, WMD,
internecine
fighting –
and develop a strategy.”
162.
The author of
the PJHQ record added some “personal observations”,
including:
“The PM
came across as someone with strong convictions that this should,
and
will, go
ahead. He accepted the military advice being given to him, although
he still
sought
reassurance that all aspects had been looked into and that plans
are drawn
up to deal
with the unexpected or perceived worse cases. It is clear from the
three
areas that
he asked further work to be done on that the Phase IV part of the
plan
is critical.”
163.
Mr Blair also
asked for further advice on the outcome of the post-conflict
talks
scheduled
for Washington the following week, given the need for “much greater
clarity
about US
intentions” for the aftermath of a military
operation.51
164.
Mr Watkins
told Mr Lee:
“… we will
clearly need to use all our regular contacts with the US, in
both
CENTCOM and
the Pentagon. If appropriate, this is an issue that Mr Hoon
could
49
Minute
MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime
Minister’.
50
The Inquiry
has not seen any indication of what was meant by “the top 100 on
the list”. It is likely that
it was a
precursor to the list of 55 Iraqis featured on the “deck of cards”
issued by the US military in
April 2003.
51
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
409