The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
328.
Mr Prentice
attended his first meeting of the Iraqi Ministerial Committee on
National
Security
(MCNS) on 9 September. It was confirmed that the national JAM
cease-fire was
intended to
include suspension of all attacks on the MNF.167
329.
After visiting
Basra for the formal exchange of letters concerning the handover
of
Basra
Palace, Dr Rubaie reported to the MCNS that he had agreed with Gen
Mohan that
the Iraqi
Army would remain in the Palace in the short term, but that longer
term it should
be
renovated and used by the Government.
330.
Lt Gen Rollo
told the MCNS that the MNF had reduced its anti-JAM
operations
by 50
percent nationally after the cease-fire was announced, but EFP
attacks on MNF
had risen
and indirect fire continued unchanged. Prime Minister Maliki agreed
with
Dr Rubaie
that this should not deflect the efforts of the reconciliation
committee: if a
political solution
could be found, it should be pursued. He would take two steps
towards
peace for
every step the militants took.
331.
Lt Gen Rollo
commented in his weekly report on 10 September that Muqtada
al-
Sadr’s
cease-fire announcement had “prompted considerable debate and
action geared
at
capitalising on the situation, regardless of what it might mean in
the longer term”.168
332.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported that the handover of Basra Palace had “generated
little
interest”
in Baghdad, with “nothing but positive noises coming from my US
colleagues”.
He
continued:
“The
reality of the situation in Basra more generally is also accepted,
I believe, and
fears of
premature withdrawal or less than supportive behaviour from the
British
appear to
be decreasing. CGS’s visit provided a useful opportunity to test
the
acceptability
of a transition from current force levels to a significantly
smaller force
next
Spring, focused on assistance and development …”
333.
On 10
September, Mr Browne spoke to Secretary Gates shortly before
he reported
to
Congress.169
Secretary
Gates indicated that he expected Gen Petraeus would
recommend
that while troops should remain in Iraq as long as possible, there
were
opportunities
to draw down where the security situation allowed. Mr Browne
observed
that the UK
strategy for MND(SE) was consistent with this approach; the UK
could
re‑intervene
in the South if required.
334.
Secretary
Gates confirmed that the US was content with the UK position. The
US
concern was
whether a significant UK troop reduction would jeopardise the
mission and
impact on
the commitment of other coalition partners. He encouraged
Mr Browne to
discuss the
matter with Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Eric Edelman, Under
Secretary
of Defense,
when they were in London the following week.
167
eGram
38263/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 10 September 2007, ‘Iraq:
Ministerial Committee for
National
Security (MCNS) – 9 September’.
168
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 10 September 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (269) 10
Sep 07’.
169
Letter
Forber to Fletcher, 11 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Conversation with US
Defence Secretary’.
246