14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
210.
The business
case said that it was supported by current operational
analysis
but a
“fully developed justification, in the context of a balance of
investment” would
be
undertaken in support of an “overall Project DUCKBOARD” submission
in
September
2004, where the requirement for “Snatch 2 in the worldwide role”
would
also be
established. The urgency of the current requirement meant that the
balance
of investment
analysis would not be complete before funds had to be
committed.
Evidence
would be provided in the DUCKBOARD submission to demonstrate
that
investing
in Snatch 2 “early” remained “the most cost effective
solution”.
211.
Four options
were considered in the business case:
•
do
nothing;
•
minor
refresh;
•
major
refresh (Snatch 2) – fitting the old protected “pod” on a new base
vehicle
with
upgrades to communications and ECM; or
•
a
commercial‑off‑the‑shelf solution.
212.
The preferred
option was the “major refresh”. That would not provide
additional
physical
protection; the relevant KUR said that Snatch 2 should have a
protection level
that was
“equivalent to current Snatch”.
213.
An
off‑the‑shelf purchase was discounted on the grounds of cost and
timing.
214.
Considering
publicity, the business case stated: “There will be considerable
interest
in Snatch 2
as a result of recent deaths and injuries.”
215.
In response to
a US request for additional UK forces during US operations
in
Fallujah
(see Section 9.2), including an armoured or mechanised battlegroup
to provide
a
theatre‑wide reserve, Gen Walker agreed
Lt Gen Reith’s request to return Warrior
vehicles to
Iraq on 28 April, to provide a battlegroup reserve for
MND(SE).104
216.
On 11 May,
Major General David Richards, Assistant Chief of the General
Staff
(ACGS),
received advice about the impact of Op TELIC’s expansion and
reinforcement
on
Headquarters Northern Ireland.105
A request
had been made for 297 Snatch vehicles:
77 vehicles
were needed immediately, and an additional 220 over the next three
to four
months. A
request for 350 sets of ECM equipment had also been
made.
217.
The advice
highlighted concerns about the operational implications for
Northern
Ireland of
redeploying Snatch to Iraq, particularly over the marching season.
At most,
225
vehicles could eventually be released, but that would fall short of
the Op TELIC
requirement
by 72 vehicles. It was suggested that PJHQ be directed to conduct
a
104
Minutes, 28
April 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
105
Minute MOD
[junior officer] to MA/ACGS, 11 May 2004, ‘Impact of
TELIC
Expansion and Reinforcement
on
NI’.
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