7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
“concentrating
on trying to win votes”. It was the “middle ground” that mattered.
Mexico
and Chile
were the “pivotal sceptics”.
170.
Lord Goldsmith
told No.10 officials on 27 February that the safest legal
course for
future
military action would be to secure a further Security Council
resolution.74
He
had,
however,
reached the view that a “reasonable case” could be made that
resolution 1441
was capable
of reviving the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990)
without a
further
resolution, if there were strong factual grounds for concluding
that Iraq had failed
to take the
final opportunity offered by resolution 1441.
171.
Lord Goldsmith
advised that, to avoid undermining the case for reliance
on
resolution
1441, it would be important to avoid giving any impression that the
UK
believed a
second resolution was legally required.
172.
Informal
consultations in the Security Council on 27 February showed
there was
little
support for the UK/US/Spanish draft resolution.75
173.
An Arab League
Summit on 1 March concluded that the crisis in Iraq must
be
resolved by
peaceful means and in the framework of international
legitimacy.76
174.
Following his
visit to Mexico, Sir David Manning concluded that Mexican
support
for a
second resolution was “not impossible, but would not be easy and
would almost
certainly
require some movement”.77
175.
During Sir
David’s visit to Chile, President Ricardo Lagos repeated his
concerns,
including
the difficulty of securing nine votes or winning the presentational
battle
without
further clarification of Iraq’s non-compliance. He also suggested
identifying
176.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that, during February, “despite his best
endeavours”,
divisions
in the Security Council had grown not reduced; and that the
“dynamics of
disagreement”
were producing new alliances.79
France,
Germany and Russia were
moving to
create an alternative pole of power and influence.
177.
Mr Blair
thought that was “highly damaging” but “inevitable”: “They felt as
strongly
as I did;
and they weren’t prepared to indulge the US, as they saw
it.”
74
Minute
Brummell, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Attorney General’s Meeting
at No. 10 on 27th February
2003’.
75
Telegram
318 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
27 February Consultations
and
Missiles’.
76
Telegram 68
Cairo to FCO London, 2 March 2003, ‘Arab League Summit: Final
Communique’.
77
Telegram 1
Mexico City to Cabinet Office, 1 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Mexico’.
78
Telegram 34
Santiago to FCO London, 2 March 2003, ‘Chile/Iraq: Visit by
Manning and Scarlett’.
79
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
593