14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

138. The JIC also stated that:

• Lebanese Hizballah had “a small but threatening presence in Iraq”.

• “… although Iran would prefer to influence developments in Iraq by taking

advantage of the political process”, it would “retain the option of causing trouble

for the Coalition”.

139. On 7 July, a Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) paper, circulated at a working level

within the MOD, stated that Radio‑Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) and their components had

been found in the UK Area of Operations since early April.65 The paper did not speculate

on the origin of the material.

140. On 30 July, Lt Gen Reith informed the Chiefs of Staff that there was “an increasing

use of more sophisticated IEDs, and attacks against Iraqi police and locals employed by

the Coalition”.66 There was a discussion about whether the UK should support the US in

developing RCIED countermeasures and Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief

of Defence Staff (Commitments), was directed to “assess the scope of the issue”.

141. It was reported at the next Chiefs of Staff meeting on 6 August that Lt Gen Fry’s

paper had been postponed “pending further consultation”.67 In the actions recorded from

the meeting, it stated that the paper would be discussed on 13 August.

142. The minutes also recorded that the US Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF‑7) was

to establish an IED intelligence cell to provide an “immediate in theatre threat analysis

of IEDs”.

143. A DIS paper produced on 31 July recorded that RCIEDs had been used in the UK

Area of Operations around Basra on 14 and 28 July:

“The former Iraqi regime had a proven advanced IED capability including RC

methods … Latterly there have been many (double figures) attacks against Coalition

Forces believed to have involved RCIEDs, as well as significant finds of RC‑related

hardware …

“There are a large number of former regime and ex‑military personnel skilled

in constructing and deploying IEDs who remain at large within Iraq and their

involvement in RCIED incidents would raise the level of threat. There is also the

potential for foreign groups opposed to the Coalition presence to appear within Iraq

and become engaged in attacks. If organisations such as Hizballah (that has an

extremely potent and proven RCIED capability) were to do this, then the RC threat

would increase very significantly.”68

65 Paper DIS, July 2003, ‘The Radio‑Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Threat to Coalition Forces

in Iraq’.

66 Minutes, 30 July 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

67 Minutes, 6 August 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

68 Minute MOD [junior officer] to SO1 (Info) MO3 DMO, 31 July 2003, ‘Assessment of the RCIED Threat to

Coalition Forces Deployed in Iraq’.

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