The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
756.
On 28 March,
Dr Simon Cholerton, MOD Assistant Director Iraq
(Secretariat),
advised Mr
Hoon on the considerations raised by Lord
Goldsmith.264
Dr
Cholerton was
to meet Mr
Hoon later that day.
757.
Dr Cholerton
wrote that the MOD had previously thought it unlikely that
time-
sensitive
intelligence on the whereabouts of key individuals would be
available to enable
a Coalition
attack specifically directed at an individual. That position had
changed
since the
campaign “began in earnest” and significant resources were being
devoted
to
obtaining further intelligence. AM Burridge was “now very keen” to
establish the UK
position
“as soon as possible”.
758.
Dr Cholerton
advised that the MOD was satisfied that all named individuals
were
legitimate
objectives under IHL; they were either members of the Iraqi Armed
Forces or
assessed to
be taking a direct part in hostilities.
759.
In providing
guidance for assessing the proportionality of an attack, Dr
Cholerton
wrote that
the MOD could place strict limits upon AM Burridge, such as an
upper limit on
the number
of civilian casualties as suggested by Lord Goldsmith. He
added:
“Alternatively,
we could remind the NCC [AM Burridge] in guidance that these
factors
should be
taken into account in coming to any decision, and suggest an
overall limit
on civilian
casualties of no more than […].”
760.
Dr Cholerton
assured Mr Hoon that the military justification for the targets
would be
reviewed on
“a day by day basis” and he would be advised “as soon as there was
any
significant
change with the position”.
761.
Later that
day, Dr Cholerton sent a second piece of advice to Mr Hoon
following
their
meeting with Air Cdre Heath and Mr Hemming.265
Mr Hoon had
asked how
delegation
could be varied according to the location of the
individual.
762.
Dr Cholerton
set out an approach which discriminated between the
categories
of site
where the target was believed to be located:
•
“military
location”;
•
“special
location” – such as medical facilities, places of religious
worship, historic
and
cultural sites, places of mass recreation and educational
establishments
“and other
child centred facilities”; and
•
“non-military
location” – described as “any place or premises that are
neither
a military
location or a special location”.
264
Minute
Cholerton to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 28 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC:
Targeting Individuals’.
265
Minute
Cholerton to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 28 March 2003, ‘Op
TELIC: Targeting Individuals’.
508