9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

922.  In a more detailed telegram on managing the political transition, Mr Asquith

wrote that:

“The formation of the IGC last year was unprecedented in its creation of a political

body that fairly accurately reflected Iraq’s diverse society. But its creation instituted

a specific balance of ethnic and sectarian representation in Iraq’s political

structures and empowered a specific set of players, many of whom were exiles.

Inevitably, many others were excluded. That these leaders were anointed by

the Occupying Powers had always remained a cause for criticism by political

actors outside the IGC.

“This feeling of popular resentment … was one of Brahimi’s concerns during his

recent visit. A key principle underlying his plan for the formation of an interim

government is the depoliticisation of government through the formation of an

apolitical cabinet of technocratic ministers, headed by a Prime Minister, and a

Presidency Council of a President and two Deputy Presidents.”510

923.  The process by which the interim government would be formed remained unclear,

but Mr Asquith observed that:

“Whichever option is chosen the difficulty will be managing the competing

aspirations of the dominant political players …

“Ultimately, the one political force we have to placate is [Grand Ayatollah al-] Sistani.”

924.  In a separate telegram on Shia leadership in Iraq, Mr Asquith judged that:

“… the leading Shia members of the IGC have developed ties with Sistani, and

will try to exploit this relationship to ensure their own political ascendency. The

Ayatollah’s view of the IGC parties is less clear, and he may be persuadable that a

technocratic government is preferable for the interim period.”511

925.  Mr Asquith sent a parallel telegram on the Sunni political picture.512 In it he warned:

“Continued failure to address Sunni grievances threatens the long-term stability in

Iraq. Fallujah has provoked a reassessment by those in the CPA who believed Sunni

dissatisfaction was manageable. Leaving the community insecure about its future

risks perpetuating an environment that breeds continued anti-Coalition and later

anti-Iraqi government activity.”

510  Telegram 189 IraqRep to FCO London, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Managing the Political Transition – and the

Actors; Parts 1 and 2’.

511  Telegram 187 IraqRep to FCO London, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Shia Leadership in the New Iraq’.

512  Telegram 181 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Sunni Politics’.

357