1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
The missing
155mm shells were less than 5 percent of the total stock, and
had
been
destroyed in early 1991 when a truck was set on fire. The remnants
were
still being
investigated and they should not be regarded as a serious obstacle
to
closing the
chemical file.
•
The Special
Commission could have found traces of VX, but there were
a
number of
possible explanations which could be investigated. If Iraq
had
weaponised
VX, there would have been “no reason why it should not
declare
this”;
concealment would have been “a silly act”.
•
The Special
Commission had, since 1996, “been giving a distorted and
falsified
picture of
the biological programme” which “deliberately ignored the
fundamental
facts” and
“raised lies and fabrications using intelligence methods in
co-
ordination
with American parties”.
•
The
biological weapons programme had been “newly established”, had not
been
completed,
and “remained without a specialised top management”. Iraq
had
been unable
to import any specialised equipment for the production of
biological
agents.
Iraq had “destroyed this programme completely in
1991”.
•
Since 1995,
monitoring teams had interviewed 256 personnel and carried
out
1,048
inspections at 334 sites without finding any biological weapons or
agents
and had not
found “any proof on the existence of biological activities,
current
or previous,
in sites other than those declared by Iraq which were
destroyed”.
95 sites
were still under “strict and very intrusive
monitoring”.
•
Iraq had
“accepted the sacrifice” involved in the destruction of the Al
Hakam
plant,
including facilities for civilian purposes, “after the Special
Commission
promised …
that … was the most important step for closing the biological
file”.
•
When Iraq
had given examples of the verification procedures adopted by
the
US
individual in charge of the biological file to a delegation led by
Mr Lakhdar
Brahimi on
5 November 1997, they had produced “surprise and
sarcasm”.
•
In the
technical evaluation meetings in March and July, the Commission
had
pursued
questions which “bore no relation to the fundamental questions
of
disarmament”.
•
In response
to the “vicious circle created by the Special Commission”,
Mr Aziz
had
proposed on 23 July that he and Mr Butler should
supervise the file, but his
proposal
had been rejected.
554.
In the
concluding section of his letter, Mr Aziz wrote that Iraq had
raised the
working
methods of the Special Commission many times, and some measures
had
recently
been taken, including the participation of experts from Permanent
Members
other than
the US and UK, but:
•
The “real
situation” had “not changed”, as the US and UK were “still leading
all
its
activities and define all the discussions of the Special
Commission”.
•
It was
“well known” that the US and UK had “tendentious political
objectives
against
Iraq”.
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